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Abstract
The claim of this thesis is that both formal and expressive qualities are 
equally relevant to our judgements concerning the aesthetic value of music.
I limit my enquiry to the case of instrumental music. This is principally 
because, instrumental music seems to represent the “hard case” for my 
thesis, as while it appears uncontroversial that instrumental music has a 
specifiable form, it is less clear that it has expressive content, due to its 
abstract nature. Although the formalist would have us accept that the 
aesthetic value of instrumental music is to be found in its form alone, I 
believe that to exclude the expressive qualities of music from our aesthetic 
evaluation of it is misguided. Accordingly, I provide accounts of both the 
nature and value of the experiences of form and expression in music. I argue 
that formal, as well as expressive qualities, are subjectively determined 
features of our aesthetic experience, and that it is these features, manifested 
in our experience, that are the objects of our aesthetic judgements. I 
maintain that it is our musical understanding that determines the perceived 
formal and expressive qualities, which are the contents of that experience. 
This view departs from traditional approaches to aesthetics in that it admits 
to a degree of subjectivity, not only in our ascriptions of expressive content 
but also of form.
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Introduction
The principal aim of this work is to support the view that both formal and 
expressive qualities are equally relevant to our judgements concerning the 
aesthetic value of music. I will argue that formal as well as expressive 
qualities are subjectively determined features of our aesthetic experience, 
and that it is these features, manifested in our experience, that are the 
objects of our aesthetic judgements. I shall maintain that it is our musical 
understanding that transforms our experience of sound into an experience of 
music for example, and that this process also determines the perceived 
formal and expressive properties which are the contents of that experience. 
This view departs from traditional approaches to aesthetics in that it admits 
to a degree of subjectivity, not only in our ascriptions of expressive content 
but also of form.
Instrumental music is the most natural counter-example to the thesis. This is 
principally because, while it seems uncontroversial that instrumental music 
has a specifiable form, it can seem very difficult to understand how 
instrumental music has expressive content due to its abstract nature. 
Instrumental music thus represents the “hard case” for the idea that both 
form and content are relevant to the aesthetic value of music. So from now 
on, when I refer to music, I intend this to mean only instrumental music, by 
which I wish to exclude not just music which has vocal content, but also 
music set to a text.
Both in the world of music criticism, as well as in the philosophical 
literature on music, there is an on-going debate between what we may 
loosely term the “formalists” and the “expressivists”. Formalists claim that a 
true appreciation of the aesthetic value of music should be concerned 
principally with music’s so-called “formal” properties. I shall say more
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about these in part two, but roughly speaking, they are the building blocks 
of a musical arrangement such as the rhythmic, melodic and harmonic 
structures. Part of the motivation for the formalist approach to aesthetic 
appreciation of music is that formal properties seem to enjoy an objective 
existence that expressive properties do not. They are thought to be part of 
the music independently of our experience of it, whereas music’s 
expressiveness seems to depend on an individual hearing it as such.
The formalist thinks that they have the best chance of ascertaining an 
objective basis for determining the aesthetic value of music. They seek to 
narrow the definition of our aesthetic appreciation of music to pure form in 
part, also as a reaction to a certain kind of interpretation and content 
attribution that is popular in some music criticism. Much of this was felt to 
be quite unjustified, especially in cases where it was claimed that the music, 
purely in virtue of its timbres and arrangements for example, is expressive 
of complex thoughts and ideas.
Nonetheless, there is the lingering sense that by annexing off our 
understanding of music as an expressive medium, we are doing music, and 
ultimately ourselves, a great disservice. After all, music has been linked 
more strongly to the expression of the emotions than any other art form, 
sometimes referred to as the language of the emotions and even suppressed 
because of the fear that it carried undesirable emotional messages. In 
keeping with this kind of view, we can characterise expressivists as those 
who believe that it is certain of music’s non-formal qualities, most 
significantly its “expressive” qualities, which are of paramount importance 
in respect to questions of aesthetic value. One example of the kind of 
underlying motivation here, would be the thought that music is a means of 
emotional communication and thus to ignore this aspect of it is to 
misunderstand music altogether.
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Both of these two views in the kinds of caricatured forms I have just 
outlined are evidently fraught with difficulty. For example, in order to make 
a convincing case for expressivism, we must provide an account of how 
instrumental music might be expressive, that not only agrees with our 
experience of the phenomenon of expression, but also shows that there is a 
genuine link between the music and what it expresses. If the connection 
between the music and what it expresses is really an illusion, or purely in 
the mind of the listener, it might seem that the formalist has won the debate: 
music cannot be valued aesthetically for a property that it does not actually 
possess. However, the formalist faces the challenge of providing a 
convincing argument for us to believe that the experience of music as pure 
structure of sound is the only aesthetically relevant experience of music.
In what follows, I will argue that to restrict our aesthetic evaluation of music 
to form is misguided. However, I shall also argue that there is not at present 
a satisfactory account of expression that can show us either how music is in 
general experienced as expressive, or how there might be one correct 
application of emotion terms to a piece of music. What the discussion of 
expression does reveal is that it is an aspect of the listener’s experience of 
music that is manifest when the listener is in the appropriate condition to 
perceive it.
The discussion will proceed in four parts. In part one I will investigate the 
nature of aesthetic experience. I shall assume that our judgements 
concerning the aesthetic value of music are grounded in our aesthetic 
experience of music. I will argue in favour of the so-called “content- 
orientated approach” to aesthetic experience, which holds that when we 
value music aesthetically, we value it as it is manifested to us in our 
aesthetic experience. Given this understanding of the nature of aesthetic 
experience, the remaining three parts of the discussion will be devoted to
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making a case for the claim that both formal and expressive features of 
music can be justifiably included as contents of our aesthetic experience of 
music.
Part two will be devoted to the subject of musical form. I will begin with a 
look at what I take the experience of musical form to consist in. Following 
that, I shall explore how we could value the experience of music for its 
formal qualities. Finally, I will give an account of Hanslick’s formalist 
argument for the claim that only the formal qualities of music are relevant to 
the aesthetic value of music. I will maintain that Hanslick’s argument does 
not establish that the expressiveness of music should be excluded from our 
appreciation of it.
Part three will be devoted to the much discussed topic of expression in 
music. I shall conduct a survey of some of the theories of expression that I 
think are useful in building up an overall picture of what it might for music 
to be expressive. What I hope to make clear is that there is no single 
experience of expression, and no single cause of that experience. However, 
what I also hope to establish is that we can make sense of expressiveness 
experienced as a property of music. I will then show how expression can be 
considered an aesthetically valuable quality of music.
Finally, in part four, I will address the claim that expression only has a 
subjective existence, which therefore renders it inferior to form in terms of 
its relevance to the aesthetic value of music. In answer to this, I will provide 
an account of musical understanding, which claims that both our experience 
of expressive and formal qualities of music are products of our 
understanding and therefore have only a subjective existence.
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1. Aesthetic Value and Aesthetic Experience
The aim of this part is to investigate whether an analysis of aesthetic 
experience can provide us with a reason to think that both formal and 
aesthetic properties are relevant to our aesthetic judgments. I will take it that 
when we judge something to have aesthetic value, the objects of such 
judgments are the properties revealed to us in our aesthetic experience. For 
example, musical works (at least in the vast majority of cases) are created to 
be heard and so it is natural to think that the aesthetic value of a piece of 
music must be somehow related to one’s aesthetic experience of hearing it. 
However, the nature and content of aesthetic experience has been specified 
in a number of different ways.
In what follows I will consider four possible accounts of the nature of 
aesthetic experience. I will argue that three of them; the affect-orientated 
approach, the epistemic approach and the axiological approach (which 
connects aesthetic experience with a particular type of value), are incorrect 
accounts of aesthetic experience. I will concur with Noel Carroll (2006) that 
a content-based approach to defining aesthetic experience seems most 
promising.
1.1. The Affect-Orientated Approach
The affect-orientated approach claims that aesthetic experience is 
distinguished from other experiences by a particular type of felt effect. The 
idea is that we are experiencing a piece of music aesthetically for example, 
if and only if we are experiencing a certain distinctive type of feeling. 
Naturally, proponents of this view need to be more specific about the nature 
of this feeling if their theory is to do any work. One suggestion for the type 
of feeling involved is sensual pleasure.
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However, it is obvious that pleasure is not sufficient for aesthetic 
experience. If this were the case, then many experiences would count as 
aesthetic, some of which are more commonly thought antithetical to 
aesthetic experience, such as the pleasurable effects of a good meal. But 
perhaps some notion of pleasure is a necessary condition of aesthetic 
experience, if not a sufficient one. However, this would seem to rule out the 
possibility of a negative aesthetic experience. Building an inherently 
positive notion such as pleasure into the definition of aesthetic experience 
seems to be unnecessarily conflating two notions. It is argued by Dickie 
(1989) for example, that the concept of a work of art should be neutral as to 
the value of the work. If we define the concept of a work of art as something 
that is inherently good, we rob ourselves of the right to condemn anything 
as a bad work of art. Furthermore, there are works of art that are intended to 
induce responses of disgust or horror, which seem to be counter-examples to 
the notion that pleasure is a necessary condition for aesthetic experience. 
However, the affective theorist might respond to this by maintaining that 
even though we experience feelings of disgust in response to these kinds of 
artworks, there is nonetheless a certain sense of pleasure that also 
accompanies the experience.
Another consideration that weighs against the idea that pleasure might be a 
necessary condition of aesthetic experience however, is that it is conceivable 
that one might have an aesthetic experience and yet feel nothing at all. In 
response, some appeal to something like disinterested or intellectual 
pleasure as what demarcates aesthetic experience. However, this would 
amount to an admission of defeat on behalf of the proponent of the affect- 
orientated approach as disinterested pleasure has no distinctive 
phenomenological effect; when one experiences disinterested pleasure, one 
experiences no felt effect. The distinctiveness of disinterested pleasure is in 
the intentional content of the pleasure. That is to say, one appreciates the
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beauty of something with no regard to its possession or bearing to oneself 
for example (Carroll, 2006, pp.73-74).
A further possibility is that the distinctive kind of feeling involved in 
aesthetic experience is a sense of relief. Schopenhauer (1969, bk. 3) for 
example, was a pioneer of the thought that in aesthetic experience, one is 
temporarily liberated from the shackles of ordinary existence and one’s 
consciousness lifted into an atemporal domain of pure contemplation in 
which the object of one’s aesthetic experience is appreciated in isolation 
from its relations to all other objects in the world. For Schopenhauer then, 
there is a distinctive state that aesthetic experience offers us, which would 
(again) seem to be inherently positive. This can be so even if we grant that 
some aesthetic experiences may in fact be unpleasant. On Schopenhauer’s 
account there is an inherent benefit of aesthetic experience which transcends 
the more prosaic kinds of pleasure or pain.
Schopenhauer is not alone in having linked the idea of aesthetic experience 
with a sense of relief from everyday reality. As Carroll points out, many 
other thinkers have suggested similar experiences. Carroll (2006, p. 75) 
writes:
“For Clive Bell, it is the experience of being lifted out of the quotidian; for 
Edward Bullough, it is a feeling of being distanced; Monroe C. Beardsley 
calls it felt freedom. In this way of thinking, aesthetic experience does come 
suffused with its own variety of affect, a specifiable modality of pleasure, 
namely a sense of release from mundane, human preoccupations with 
respect to oneself, one’s tribe (both narrowly and broadly construed), and 
humanity at large.”
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The problem for this kind of approach is that it has to be very specific about 
the kind of release from ordinary reality that it has in mind if this is to be 
considered a sufficient condition for aesthetic experience.* Otherwise, the 
kind of relief that one has from a drug might qualify as being just as much 
of an aesthetic experience as say looking at a Rembrandt. What one needs to 
adopt is something like the sense of relief that Schopenhauer offered, a state 
in which we are uniquely liberated from what he regarded as the intolerable 
and incessant suffering of everyday existence. However, although 
Schopenhauer’s notion of metaphysical solace in art is perhaps a distinctive 
enough one to separate the aesthetic experience from other kinds of relief, it 
again makes the debateable move of proclaiming that all aesthetic 
experience is inherently a good thing, and as aforementioned, intuitively, it 
seems that we must reserve the right to say that some aesthetic experiences 
are negative and indeed, in some cases, simply not worth having.
1.2. The Epistemic Approach
The epistemic view of aesthetic experience claims that aesthetic experience 
is characterised by a particular way of coming to know an object.
Proponents of the view hold that it is a necessary condition that one has an 
unmediated, firsthand experience of an object in order to have an aesthetic 
experience of it. This kind of experience cannot be provided by the 
testimony of others. While there is a temptation to understand this approach 
to aesthetic experience as appealing to purely perceptual experience, doing 
so obviously gives rise to a problem, so long as we think that one can have 
aesthetic experiences of literature and poetry (when we are reading it to 
ourselves). So the claim is that aesthetic experience is the experience of only 
those properties of an object available through direct inspection (which 
presumably rules out instances of someone telling you about a poem or 
novel rather than reading it to you).
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An intuitively appealing aspect of the epistemic approach is that one’s 
aesthetic experience of an object must be determined by the experience of 
that object alone. However, the idea that the experience of an object must be 
direct for it to be an aesthetic experience seems questionable. If it not the 
case that the object must be present to us for us to be having an aesthetic 
experience of it, then the claim of the epistemic theorist is false.
Carroll suggests that conceptual art can serve as a counter-example to the 
idea that direct acquaintance with an object is required to have an aesthetic 
experience of it. He uses the example of Marcel Duchamp’s famous work 
Fountain. The reason Fountain seems to be a counterexample to the 
epistemic approach, according to Carroll, is that one need not have direct 
acquaintance with it (i.e. see it displayed in an art gallery). One can simply 
visit a well preserved French lavatory in order to understand the piece and 
how it achieves its artistic goals (which presumably include challenging our 
preconceptions about the nature of art). But Carroll’s point seems to be open 
to the charge of question-begging. In order for the indirect experience of 
conceptual art like Fountain to be a counter-example to the epistemic 
approach, we need some independent reason to think that indirect 
experience of Fountain is an aesthetic experience. Carroll (2006, p.78) 
contends that:
“ ...the identification and or/appreciation of the form of an artwork is 
perhaps the paradigmatic example of an aesthetic experience.”
Carroll rightly assumes that the likelihood is that we can all agree on this 
last claim. However, by itself, this does not amount to much of a counter to 
the epistemic theorist. To make it so, Carroll supplements the 
uncontroversial claim that experiencing form is to have an aesthetic 
experience, with the more controversial claim that one need not experience
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the work directly to have an experience of its form. Carroll (2006, p. 78) 
defines form in the following way:
“The form of an artwork is the ensemble of choices intended to realize the 
point of purpose of an artwork.”
Carroll (2006, p. 78) thinks that we can:
“ .. .grasp the pertinent choice or ensemble of the choices and the 
corresponding interrelationships that enable an artwork to secure its point or 
purpose without inspecting the work directly.”
The idea is that from a photograph or even a reliable description, one is able 
to discern and presumably recreate the form of the artwork in one’s mind 
and in doing so, be the subject of a paradigmatically aesthetic experience. 
Evidently however, there is some aspect of what we would normally take to 
be an aesthetic experience that is not available via testimony. It is difficult 
to imagine a description rich and precise enough that would enable us to 
have indirectly and yet completely experienced the exact shades of colour in 
a Rothko painting, for example. However, all that is needed to undermine 
the epistemic account is that we accept that some part of the aesthetic 
experience of a piece of work is available indirectly.
Let us consider a musical example. It seems relatively uncontroversial to 
say that to experience music is to experience some sonic event; moreover 
the paradigmatic instance of experiencing music directly would be 
something like attending a concert. What then, do we say of the person who 
is handed the score of a newly composed piece of music and then proceeds 
to read it, imagining the music in their head as they do so? This kind of 
experience is of a fundamentally different kind to that of the concert goer.
14
There are no sound waves conveying the music to the score reader’s ear. 
Nonetheless, it would surely be absurd to say that the score reader was 
unable to appreciate or at least have access to some of the total potential 
aesthetic experience the music has to offer. Would we say that Beethoven 
had never experienced the aesthetic qualities of any of his later 
compositions after he had lost his hearing? Not only do I think we would 
say that he did have such experiences, but I think it would be fair to say that 
with a musical imagination like his must have been, he would have been 
able to experience aesthetic qualities of his music that very few others can. 
The epistemic theorist might backtrack a little and suggest that in order to 
genuinely have had an aesthetic experience, the subject must at some point 
directly experience the work in order to validate their original indirect 
experience. However, once again the Beethoven example seems to refute 
such a suggestion.
Understood in this way, it seems uncontroversial that we are able to have at 
least a partial (if not considerable in the case of music) aesthetic experience, 
indirectly of an object. Therefore, the epistemic approach cannot be 
completely correct, even if it might be correct in respect to some kinds of 
aesthetic properties and is well motivated insofar as it makes the particular 
work of art essential to the experience.
1.3. The Axiological Approach
Proponents of the axiological approach to aesthetic experience maintain that 
one’s experience is aesthetic if and only if one judges it to be valuable for its 
own sake. This approach to defining aesthetic experience allows for the 
possibility that one have an aesthetic experience that is not pleasurable, but 
that is nonetheless valuable. This enables the axiological approach (unlike 
the affect-orientated approach, as mentioned earlier) to account for the fact
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that we apparently have unpleasant yet valuable aesthetic experiences from 
time to time.
However, it seems implausible to consider valuing an experience for its own 
sake a sufficient condition of aesthetic experience. If it were a sufficient 
condition for aesthetic experience, experiences such as playing a game 
(generally something done for its own sake) would count as aesthetic. For 
now, I will consider that although it may not be a sufficient condition of 
aesthetic experience, valuing the experience for its own sake might be a 
necessary condition of having an aesthetic experience. But it seems that 
even thinking of valuing for its own sake as a necessary condition of 
aesthetic experience results in the conflation of aesthetic experience with 
aesthetic judgement. Such a move is undesirable as it blocks the possibility 
for aesthetic experiences, which involve no judgement at all. And it does 
seem that we occasionally do have aesthetic experiences and yet make no 
value judgment about the experience, either through indifference or because 
we are simply experiencing in a comparatively unfocused manner. Carroll 
(2006, p. 82) suggests that this might happen when one listens to music for 
example. He writes:
“One may follow the formal permutations of a musical theme as it moves 
from one section of the orchestra to another and yet judge the experience as 
without value, either intrinsic or otherwise, because the artwork itself is 
unintentionally grating. Or perhaps the formal structure is respectable 
enough, but uninspired in a way that gives rise to indifference. In such cases 
where one’s attention is directed in the right way at the formal design of the 
work, it seems appropriate to call the aforesaid responses aesthetic 
experiences (how else could we categorise them), but they are not valued for 
their own sake, since they are not valued at all.”
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In response, the defender of the axiological approach might contend that 
even if we are neutral (or indifferent) towards the form of a piece of music 
for example, that in itself is a value judgement regarding our experience of 
it. We have assigned it a value of zero. Indeed, it might be the case that we 
instinctively judge the contents of all our experiences. If this is so, the 
necessary condition of valuing something for its own sake might be a useful 
(and reasonable) way of distinguishing a subset of experiences, of which 
aesthetic experience is perhaps a further subset (through the addition of 
some other necessary condition(s) would be required to mark out aesthetic 
experience). On the other hand, if we do not think that all our experiences 
involve some kind of value judgment, or we think that the relevant value 
judgements must be conscious (it is surely uncontroversial that not all of our 
experiences involve conscious judgments), then there is room for the 
thought that we might have aesthetic experiences without making any kind 
of relevant value judgement. Consequently, the proponent of the axiological 
approach might want to weaken the connection between value and aesthetic 
experience even further to maintain that only i f  the experience is one that is 
valued (positively or negatively) then it must be so for its own sake to count 
as aesthetic. This allows that one may have an aesthetic experience that is 
not valued. However, it seems that even placing this restriction on aesthetic 
experience is too strict.
This brings me to the ambiguity in the idea of valuing something for its own 
sake. Something’s being valued for its own sake could mean that it is valued 
objectively, i.e. from no particular point of view, or it could mean valuing it 
subjectively, ie. in the mind of the experiencing individual. If the claim is 
the former, it is quite hard to make sense of. What could it be to value 
something objectively for its own sake, from no particular perspective or 
value system (Carroll, 2006, p.83)7 It seems that valuing something for its 
own sake must be a subjective (or at least intersubjective) activity.
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However, in light of this distinction, aesthetic experiences seem to have 
only instrumental value objectively. As Carroll (2006, p. 84) points out:
“Aesthetic experiences are generally shared amongst audiences - theatre 
goers, filmgoers, concert goers, dance aficionados, and the like -  who find 
themselves in congruent emotive states. This is clearly an advantage from 
an evolutionary point of view, since it nurtures a feeling of group cohesion. 
This suggests one way in which aesthetic experience is objectively valuable 
instrumentally and explains, at least in part, why societies cultivate it -  why 
it appears to be a focus of important activity universally or nearly 
universally.”
Even if the axiological theorist admits that it is only subjectively that an 
aesthetic experience is valued for its own sake and that aesthetic experiences 
are valued instrumentally in the sense just highlighted, further problems 
arise for the axiological theorist. For example, consider a case in which 
there are two people who are both listening to the same piece of music. The 
first person is one who believes in the notion of intrinsic value, while the 
second is an evolutionary psychologist who believes that the kind of 
experience the aesthete and he are having is valuable in the objective 
instrumental sense. For example, he might believe that listening to music 
makes people in general more amicable with one another, and thus has a 
distinct social benefit. In any case, in this example, we must imagine that 
the evolutionary psychologist is aware and attentive to all the same features 
of the music that the aesthete is. He can point out the various formal 
structures and developments as well as being able to give an appropriate 
reading of the music’s expressive properties. We can even assume that the 
evolutionary psychologist feels all that the other person feels in response to 
the music (Carroll, 2006, p.85). Nonetheless, according to the axiological 
theory of aesthetic experience, only the first person qualifies as having an
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aesthetic experience. This conclusion seems to be open to objection. To say 
that one experience is aesthetic while the other isn’t, purely on the basis of 
differing views of behalf of the people in question as to why one should 
want to have that experience does not seem to be an appropriate way of 
distinguishing between the aesthetic and non-aesthetic. It seems incorrect 
that the beliefs held by the two people in the example should be taken to 
distinguish between two experiences which are by hypothesis 
phenomenologically identical.
1.4. The Content-Orientated Approach
I take the content-orientated approach to be the most promising account of 
aesthetic experience. It aims to define aesthetic experience as being that 
which has a certain type of content, or is directed at particular kinds of 
properties. The typical constituents of an aesthetic experience include the 
form of the work and other properties such as the work’s expressiveness. 
Carroll maintains that these are the least controversial of the supposed 
contents of aesthetic experience. He also says that aesthetic experience is 
typically directed at the way in which these kinds of elements are combined 
and how they influence our awareness of them. Thus the content-orientated 
approach can be defined disjunctively as Carroll (2006, p. 89) explains:
“The content-oriented theorist of aesthetic experience conjectures that if 
attention is directed with understanding to the form of the artwork, and/or to 
its expressive or aesthetic properties, and/or to the interaction between these 
features, and/or to the way in which the aforesaid factors modulate our 
response to the artwork, then the experience is aesthetic.”
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Carroll accepts that both formal and expressive properties are candidates for 
being the content of an aesthetic experience. Regarding the status of such 
aesthetic properties in general, Carroll (2006, p. 91) explains that:
“These [aesthetic] properties supervene on the primary and secondary 
properties of the relevant objects of attention, as well as upon certain 
relational properties, including art-historical ones, such as genre or category 
membership. Aesthetic properties emerge from these lower order properties; 
they are dispositions to promote impressions or effects on appropriately 
backgrounded creatures with our perceptual and imaginative capabilities.”
Carroll’s account can be understood as deflationary in that it does not 
provide a set of necessary and sufficient conditions, but only an incomplete 
disjunction (Iseminger, 2006). Instead, Carroll’s account merely tells us 
what some of the sorts of things aesthetic experience might be an experience 
of. i.e. a list of what we take to be aesthetic properties such as formal and 
expressive properties. Carroll’s claim is that there is no conception of 
aesthetic experience that has as its essence, a distinctive phenomenology or 
structure.
Conclusion
To sum up, the affect-orientated and epistemic approaches to aesthetic 
experience have been shown to be flawed. The two main contenders for an 
account of aesthetic experience, as discussed, are the axiological and 
content-orientated approaches. The axiological approach holds that 
whenever we value an experience for its own sake, it is an aesthetic 
experience. As such, formal and expressive properties in music would be 
relevant to aesthetic value, as long as we valued the experience of them for 
its own sake. However, as it has been argued, accounting for the nature of
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aesthetic experience in terms of valuing something for its own sake is 
problematic. Valuing an experience for its own sake cannot be a sufficient 
condition of aesthetic experience as this would render many experiences 
aesthetic, which do not seem to be of an aesthetic nature intuitively. It seems 
more plausible to say that our experience is an aesthetic one when it is of 
particular properties. Formal and expressive properties are typically 
regarded as paradigmatic examples of such properties. However, the 
question arises as to whether we are justified in taking this to be the case. It 
is to this question that I now turn.
2. Form
Form is typically considered to be a property of music that exists 
independently of our experience of it. It can be roughly characterised as the 
purely audible experience with regards to the music. Formalists argue that 
aesthetic value is to be found in the experience of form alone. However, the 
experience of music is often thought to be first and foremost an emotional 
one. To many, the thought that we might value the experience of a piece of 
music without any reference to emotion is quite counter-intuitive.
This part will be divided into three sections. In the first, I will give a cursory 
account of what exactly I shall understand by the formal qualities of music. 
In section two, I will then discuss how we might come to value a piece of 
music for its formal qualities. In the third section, I shall consider 
Hanslick’s argument for a musical formalism. I will conclude by showing 
how Hanslick’s arguments do not close the door on the possibility that we 
might justifiably locate the aesthetic value of music in more than just its 
formal qualities.
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2.1. What is Form?
The term “form” is used in a variety of ways in different musicological 
contexts. Douglas Green (1979, ch.l) says that form, in its most broad 
sense, can be understood as having three main “sub-meanings”. These are 
musical genre, musical shape and musical form.
Musical genres are the terms we use to broadly categorise certain musical 
frameworks that have become popularised by composers. Examples include 
an aria (a sung piece consisting of an accompanied solo voice), or a cantata 
(a piece of music with narrative or descriptive content and involving vocal 
solos as well as a chorus and ensemble). However, as Green points out, the 
term genre might also be used in a broader sense, such as when we talk 
about the different genres of classical and rock music for example. This is 
not the sense of genre Green is referring to.
Green (1979, p. 3) describes musical shape as follows:
“The term “shape”, when applied to music, refers to the surface contour of a 
piece.”
The “surface contour” of a piece of music is intended to refer to the degree 
of fluctuation and intensity of dynamic elements, such as the rise and fall in 
general volume level. The use of the word shape with regards to music is a 
prominent example of how pervasive spatial metaphors are in our 
descriptions of music. We typically refer to notes as being higher or lower, 
and often use other visual or even tactile concepts for describing timbres of 
sound, such as brighter or softer. The dynamic differences between the two 
events provide points on an imaginary graph and the shape of a piece of
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music is arrived at by tracing an imaginary line from the dynamic peak of 
one musical event to another.
According to Green, musical form is to be understood as made up of two 
distinct elements; design and tonal structure. Green (1979, p. 4) defines 
these elements in the following way:
“Design is the organisation of those elements of music called melody, 
rhythm, cadences, timbre, and tempo. The harmonic organisation of a piece 
is referred to as its tonal structure.”
An uncomplicated example of harmonic organisation would be the way in 
which a typical blues song, the harmonic development begins with the tonic 
(based on the root note), before moving up to fourth, then the fifth, and back 
again. Once the tune has returned home to the tonic, there is typically a 
sense of resolution that would not have been present had it finished, open- 
ended, on the fifth or fourth note of the scale.
It might be pointed out that there are a myriad other elements in our 
experience of music that, while seemingly relevant to our purely audible 
experience of music, don’t fit into any of Green’s three interpretations of the 
meaning of musical form. These include what can be described as elements 
of the construction, and would include aspects such as the tones and timbres 
of the instruments (or the sounds used) and individual chords (while these 
do have an internal structure of their own, in the formal context of a piece of 
music they are often regarded as in some sense “atomic”).
For the purposes of this thesis, I shall take musical form to include both 
what Green calls musical shape and musical form, as well the elements 
detailed above, which Green’s categories make no room for. To reiterate, I
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will understand form as equivalent to whatever is present in our purely 
audible experience, which does not seem to include Green’s category of 
genre.
2.2. Form and Value
Instrumental music is typically regarded as an abstract art. That is to say, 
instrumental music is not thought to be representative of the world around 
us in the way that literature for example generally is. As a result, it has often 
been suggested that to understand and appreciate such music does not 
require our experience to have been informed by the concepts which 
typically apply to the world outside music, and which are essential if we are 
to understand a novel, poem or play. Thinking of instrumental music in this 
way has created something of a puzzle as regards its value; namely, why do 
people seem to find it profoundly rewarding to immerse themselves in the 
abstract sounds of instrumental music which as Malcolm Budd (1995, 
p. 126) says is:
“ .. .about as far removed from everything they value in their extra-musical 
lives as anything could be.”
This problem is closely related to what Peter Kivy (2001, p. 156) has called 
the “problem of absolute music”. For Kivy, the term “absolute music” 
denotes a type of music for which only a structural, as opposed to a content 
interpretation is applicable. We might roughly characterise the difference 
between these in the following way: a structural interpretation of a piece of 
music is concerned only with the arrangement of the parts and their relations 
to one another. A content interpretation on the other hand, is one where the 
parts identified in the structural interpretation are taken to refer to, as
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symbols for, or as being expressive of, something in the non-musical world. 
With this in mind:
. .the problem of absolute music, briefly stated, is the problem of why and 
how such music is enjoyable and important for us, given that it lacks just 
those things that content interpretation deals with, and which seem to play 
so prominent a role in our enjoyment and appreciation, and which seems so 
vital to the value that the fine arts hold for us. Denuded of the things that 
content interpretation reveals, which is left but an empty structural shell? 
Yet that empty, structural shell is just what a piece of absolute music must 
be, if it is defined as music for which only structural interpretation is 
appropriate. That is the problem.” (Kivy, 2001, p. 157)
But, in order for there to be such a problem of absolute music, then it must 
(as Kivy acknowledges) be true that there is music for which no content 
interpretation is appropriate. Is it true that we can and do listen to music 
purely for the experience of that “structural shell”? Kivy (2001, p. 167) 
certainly thinks that this is not only possible but a common practice. Kivy 
(2001) states that much of modem music criticism and interpretation, what 
he calls “the new musicology”, is now aimed at accounting for the greatness 
of pieces of music by providing an understanding of that music, which goes 
beyond its form. However, what Kivy wants us to remember is that there is 
another way of listening to music that involves nothing but our perception 
of the patterns and sounds of the music itself. This view of the appreciation 
of music is articulated in the work of Eduard Hanslick (1957). In his book 
The Beautiful in Music, Hanslick argued that any not specifically musical 
content that was ascribed to music, emotional or otherwise, was to be 
rejected as irrelevant to our aesthetic evaluation of the music. I shall 
consider Hanslick’s arguments for this claim in more detail in the next 
section of this part. In this section, I will only be concerned with
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explanations as to what it is to appreciate music purely for its formal 
qualities.
The appreciation of music for Hanslick (1957, p. 11) is primarily an 
intellectual activity, one that aims:
. .above all, at producing something beautiful which affects not our 
feelings but the organ of pure contemplation, our imagination.”
It is this notion of intellectual contemplation or what Hanslick also calls 
“attentive hearing” that is the key to understanding how we might appreciate 
the value of music, independently of any feelings of sensual pleasure or 
other emotional effects. Hearing attentively involves performing a “ ... 
mental inspection of a succession of mental images” (Hanslick, 1957. p.l 1). 
This act of “pure” listening is one where we are engaged with the music and 
nothing else. Hanslick takes music to be a self-sufficient system and its aims 
are specifically musical rather than relating to anything extraneous. That is 
to say, he thinks that music “...consists wholly of sounds artistically 
combined” (Hanslick, 1957, p.47). The tools available to the composer are 
melody, harmony and rhythm which are used to express strictly musical 
ideas. These are ends in themselves and not means to anything else, 
according to Hanslick. He draws an insightful analogy to express this point 
where he likens a musical composition to an arabesque. He says:
“We see a plexus of flourishes, now bending into graceful curves, now 
rising in bold sweeps; moving now toward, and now away from each other; 
... If, moreover, we conceive this living arabesque as the active emanation 
of inventive genius, the artistic fullness of whose imagination is incessantly 
flowing into the heart of these moving forms, the effect, we think will be not 
unlike that of music.” (Hanslick, 1957, p.48)
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So the first point to note is that the appreciation of music’s form is a kind of 
intellectual pleasure. It is interesting to note that Hanslick does endorse the 
use of non-formal terms for the description of our experience of music’s 
form, so long as the use of such terms is recognised as purely figurative. 
Such terms are used only to point out what would otherwise be difficult (or 
perhaps impossible) to express in a purely musical vocabulary. This is a 
point which will be elaborated upon in the next section.
In his book Music Alone, Kivy (1990) provides an explanation of some of 
the how we might derive pleasure from the experience of musical structures. 
He identifies two main processes which he calls the “hypothesis game” and 
the “hide-and-seek game”. The hypothesis game draws on Leonard Meyer’s 
(1956) analysis of musical appreciation. The thought is that events can be 
rated in terms of their information value. The more informative an event is, 
the more unexpected and surprising it is, and the greater the sense of 
newness it presents. Events can be arranged on a scale with those that are 
completely unexpected and surprising at one end and those that are entirely 
predictable and anticipated at the other. Meyer applies this idea to the notion 
of musical events and this forms the basis for the hypothesis game described 
by Kivy. In terms of the musical events themselves, Kivy distinguishes 
between two kinds. One the one hand we have syntactical events and on the 
other there are formal events. Syntactical events are the small scale events 
that collectively make up the musical structure. These events are, at least in 
most cases, governed by the “rules” or conventions of musical theory or 
grammar. As Kivy (2002, p. 72) says:
“Some have to do with melodic lines: for example, when a melody goes up 
with a leap, from one note to another five steps above, it ‘should,’ 
‘normally,’ then descend stepwise. And some have to with the manner in
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which the melodic lines can be combined in ‘counterpoint’: for example, 
when it is permissible for two melodic lines to move in parallel motion, 
when they must move in opposite directions, what intervals are permissible 
between them, and so on.”
Formal events are the larger scale events which are determined by the genre 
of the music in question. A good example is that of a symphony (during a 
particular historical phase of its development), which by design is in four 
movements, each one being a formal event. It is important to note that what 
I am calling “form” includes both Kivy’s syntactical and formal events. The 
listener will have expectations regarding the nature of forthcoming events, 
be they syntactical or formal. For instance, in what we would probably call a 
boring piece of music, the events will typically be on the low end of the 
expectation scale. They will be predictable and hold no surprises for the 
listener. To help explain the origin of these expectations, Kivy introduces a 
distinction between external and internal expectations. The external 
expectations are those that are already formed in the listener prior to their 
encounter with a particular piece of music. They are the expectations that 
one might acquire unknowingly through exposure to a particular culture, or 
perhaps through some kind of musical training. The internal expectations 
are those that are generated while listening to a particular piece of music. 
They are the expectations that we experience based on the actual musical 
events of the piece as we listen to it.
What makes a musical work interesting, and thus aesthetically valuable, on 
this account is when the level of expectation regarding events, does not stray 
too far towards either end of the scale. If all the events are too predictable 
then the music will be boring to most. On the other hand, if the events are 
all completely unexpected then the result will be an unstructured mass of
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chaotic sound. Kivy (2002, p. 75) describes how the listener plays the 
“hypothesis game” in the following way:
“He or she is thinking about the musical events taking place, is framing 
hypotheses about what is going to happen, and is sometimes surprised, 
sometimes confirmed, in his or her expectations.”
Kivy denies that the appreciation of the aesthetic value of music is being 
over intellectualised. He argues that when we are having a genuine musical 
experience, when we are actively engaged with the music and nothing else, 
we must in some sense be cognising it. That is to say, we must be actively 
and mentally engaged with the music. The essence of this view is a response 
to what is known as the stimulus theory, whereby our aesthetic evaluation of 
music is determined by its ability to stimulate pleasure in us merely by a 
“tickling” of our nerve endings and where no deliberate conscious mental 
activity is required to achieve the effect. The stimulus view does not seem to 
be correct. For one thing, if we treat the pleasure gained from listening to 
music as we would the pleasure from a drug for example, this seems to 
obscure any difference in the musical experience of someone well versed in 
music theory as opposed to the average listener, which seems to be an 
unintuitive consequence. Kivy rejects the stimulus theory for this reason. He 
writes:
“If music merely stimulated pleasure the way drugs stimulate euphoria, it 
would be impossible to make any sense at all out of what Tibby is doing, 
“who is profoundly versed in counterpoint, and holds the full score open on 
his knee.” What would being profoundly versed in anything have to do with 
musical enjoyment if music were a sonic drug? The pharmacologist who is 
profoundly versed in the ways in which heroin affects the brain does not get 
a different or more enjoyable ‘high’ from it than does the neighbourhood
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addict who knows nothing at all about how the substance works. But Tibby, 
we must suppose, is not profoundly versed in the way music gives us a high 
as the pharmacologist is profoundly versed in the way that heroin does. His 
knowledge of counterpoint and ability to read the score are enabling him to 
perceive that certain things are going on in the music, and his enjoyment of 
the music is the enjoyment o f  perceiving just those things under those 
descriptions.” (Kivy, 1990, p.40)
For Kivy, part of what distinguishes the experienced music theorist from the 
average listener is the type of concepts they each have to operate with when 
listening to music. Both employ those concepts within the framework of the 
“hypothesis game” outlined earlier and as a result, the experienced or 
trained listener can have significantly different expectations regarding the 
sequence events and so will assign different information values to those 
events.
If we accept that the hypothesis game explains what we find aesthetically 
valuable in the experience of musical form, then how do we explain the fact 
that the experience can retain its value once we have already heard it? If we 
know what events are in store then they can no longer be a surprise to us 
and thus it would seem that they begin to slide down toward the 
uninteresting, uninformative end of the scale. Kivy suggests that we can still 
engage in the expectation game with music we have already heard because 
of two reasons. The first is that in general, we are not able to remember 
precise details of the music we have heard. We usually manage to absorb 
some outlines and general themes, perhaps a melody, but, repeated listening 
will continue to provide fresh experiences of the events because our 
memory for such things is simply not that detailed. It is also worth pointing 
out that there seems a fundamental phenomenological difference between 
our ability to recall experiences in memory and the actual experience itself.
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Arguably, no matter how good our memory, the direct experience of the 
music will always have a distinctive phenomenological impact, and it is this 
impact that drives us to seek out the experience again and again rather than 
simply recall it in our minds. The second reason that the hypothesis game 
can continue to be played according to Kivy (1990, p. 77), is due to what he 
calls the “persistence of illusion”. This is a phenomenon whereby even 
though one knows full well what is going to happen in the next part of the 
composition, one is nonetheless drawn into the structure as if it were for the 
first time. It is like watching a thriller or horror film you have seen many 
times before and even though you know when the villain is going to strike, 
it still makes you jump.
In addition to the hypothesis game, the other significant process that can 
contribute to an aesthetically valuable musical experience, according to 
Kivy, is what he calls the “hide-and-seek” game. Kivy (1990, p. 78) remarks 
that classical music is typically music which exhibits a comparatively 
complex structure, and as he says:
“...it is in appreciating this complicated, intriguing structure that musical 
enjoyment has been generated.”
The hide-and-seek game involves isolating the themes and melodies that are 
more or less embedded or concealed in the structure of the music. As Kivy 
(1990, p. 78) puts it:
“In the familiar forms that Western art music has taken, in the modem era, 
the fugue, sonata form, rondo, theme and variation, and so on, the formal 
principle involved has been one kind or another in which the listener’s task 
is to find, to recognize, the principal melodies out of which the musical 
structure is constituted. It is the composer’s task to vary these melodies,
31
hide them, alter them, dismember them, and generally give the listener 
puzzles to solve. Furthermore, the standard musical forms or patterns 
involve the recurrence of themes at various places. It is the experienced 
listener’s task to recognize when the themes occur, and to orient herself 
within the musical forms or patterns. Finding one’s way in a musical form is 
part of the hide-and-seek game, and gives part of the satisfaction one derives 
from such music, and from such musical listening.”
According to Kivy, the hypothesis and the hide-and-seek games combine to 
provide us with a kind of intellectual pleasure when we listen to the form of 
music and this explains the aesthetic value we bestow on musical form. 
However, we might have some serious doubts as to whether this account is 
comprehensive enough to account for all of our experiences of music. Both 
processes, but particularly the hide-and-seek game, seem to imply that the 
more valuable music will be by and large the more complex music. But 
while more complex music certainly allows for more “puzzle solving”, it is 
not generally accepted that this makes for more valuable music. It is perhaps 
more natural to see the hide-and-seek game as an activity that some listeners 
prefer more than others. It may be a process that all listeners engage in to a 
degree but it fails to explain what we find so valuable in our experiences of 
music, which are overtly simple.
An initial response might be to say that the hide-and-seek game is only half 
the story; there is still the hypothesis game. The problem is that the 
hypothesis game also seems disproportionately to favour formally complex 
music, which is especially prominent in relation to the problem of re­
hearing music. The musical events that constitute a simple piece of music 
will become familiar much more quickly than those of even a relatively 
complex piece, but it seems undeniable that the experience of some simple 
pieces of music can retain its value even once they are known virtually by
32
heart. We cannot rely on the deficiencies of our musical memories in these 
cases. A slow melody played on a piano is significantly easier to remember 
than a piece of music which involves two or more instruments, but the piano 
piece is not necessarily much less interesting or pleasurable and hence 
valuable. All that is left is an appeal to “illusion”; namely, it could be 
claimed that we still place aesthetic value on simple music as even though 
we do know full well what is coming next, we may be so engrossed in the 
music that we fail to make any conscious predictions and in a sense, listen to 
the music as if it were new to us. It is certainly true that this sometimes 
happens, but the problem is that it need not always be the case and it is 
certainly possible for someone listening to a simple melody played on a solo 
piano, in full knowledge of what notes are to come (perhaps they know how 
to play the piece themselves) and yet still regard the experience as 
aesthetically valuable. It does seem that the actual experience of the music 
will always have an impact our imagination can never replicate.
The hypothesis and hide-and-seek games are fundamental (perhaps even 
necessary) aspects of our listening experience and they provide a good 
account of how we might value the experience of music’s form. However, 
either the experience of music as form is simply not sufficient to account for 
the way we value music, or the way in which we value our musical 
experience must include more than the hypothesis and hide-and-seek games. 
One problem with the latter contention is that it is difficult to suggest what 
this extra could be. Of course, it is always possible to say it is just a brute 
fact that some forms strike one as inherently aesthetically valuable. Apart 
from making discussion of the aesthetic value of music philosophically 
redundant, this kind of response is also awkward in that it is not clear that 
certain forms are just inherently valuable to us. A person might come to 
value negatively the experience of the formal qualities of a piece of music 
that he previously held in high regard, and the reverse is also equally
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possible. Thus while we seem to be able to make sense of how one might 
come to value a piece of music for its formal qualities alone, it is less 
obvious that this accounts for all judgements concerning the aesthetic value 
of music. Nonetheless, one might object that whatever else we value about 
the music is in fact irrelevant to its aesthetic value. That we do sometimes 
attribute value to music for musically unrelated reasons is certainly true, but 
if we are to be at all accurate in our estimations of the aesthetic value of the 
music, we should be concerned with only those properties which we 
experience as belonging to the music itself. In the next part I shall consider 
some arguments to this effect.
2.3. Hanslick’s Argument for Musical Formalism
The core idea of formalism in music is that the aesthetic value of music is to 
be found only in its form. However, the principal claim of formalism is 
sometimes understood as a negative one. The theory most confidently says 
what music does not do. As Andy Hamilton (2007, p. 71) puts it:
“Formalism says that form, as opposed to content, meaning, representation 
or extrinsic purpose, is the primary element of aesthetic value.”
Hanslick’s attack on the view that to appreciate the aesthetic value of music 
requires attributing it content above and beyond its form, can be split into 
three lines of argument. The kind of content that I will be concerned with in 
this discussion is emotional content and ultimately the thought that music is 
aesthetically valuable in virtue of its being expressive of emotion. Each 
argument is concerned with a different way in which emotions are said to be 
integral to our experience of music. The first is in terms of the emotions or 
feelings aroused in the listener, the second is through music’s being 
representative of emotion and the third is through music’s ability to express
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emotion. As I am mainly concerned with the relevance of expression to 
value, I shall devote most space to that argument. However, it is worthwhile 
to discuss Hanslick’s treatment of arousal and representation, as the 
criticisms he raises against these possibilities will resurface in the discussion 
of expression in music in part three. In each case, Hanslick’s claim is a 
strong one. He does not say simply that there are pieces of music for which 
no emotional element is relevant (as Kivy suggests there are). Rather, he 
argues that no emotional content is ever relevant to the aesthetic value of a 
piece of music. This is important, as few of us would be tempted to disagree 
with the former claim, but the latter, stronger claim, directly contradicts 
what we can safely assume to be the dominant view in music appreciation; 
namely, that great pieces of music are aesthetically valuable at least partly in 
virtue of their emotional power.
For Hanslick, the value or what he refers to as the “beauty” of music had 
nothing to do with the emotional states the composer, performer or audience 
might have been experiencing at the time when they were involved with the 
music. In any case, the first two possibilities are easy to reject as irrelevant 
to our aesthetic evaluation of the music. In the case of the composer, he 
might have created the same piece of music regardless of how he might 
have felt at the time. Therefore, the emotional significance of the piece, 
should it have any, is irrespective of that of the composer. The idea that our 
emotional ascriptions of the music correlate with the emotions felt by the 
composer is not an essential condition to our ascribing them to the music in 
the first place. Similarly, the emotions of the performer might tally with 
those we apply to the music, but need not. In both cases, we might infer the 
emotions of the composer or the performer, but this is a result of our prior 
experience and independent estimation of the qualities of the music. The 
third case, the arousal of emotion in the listener, is more significant.
Hanslick is well aware that a typical feature of the experience of music is
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that emotion is aroused in the listener. Firstly, Hanslick objects to the fact 
that the emotions aroused in us are so variable that they betray a hopelessly 
subjective nature. This is relevant in that what Hanslick aims to establish is 
an account of the value of music that admits of as little subject-related 
relativity as possible. To say that the aesthetic value of music is in part 
related to the way people feel when they hear it, would seem to make that 
value quite indefinite and fleeting as the same music can even excite 
different feelings at different times in the same person for example. As he 
says:
“[T]he effect of music on the emotions does not possess the attributes of 
inevitableness, exclusiveness and uniformity that a phenomenon from which 
aesthetic principles are to be deduced ought to have.” (Hanslick, 1957, p. 15)
Hanslick is saying that the fact that our feelings become involved is a 
secondary feature of our experience and is extraneous to the initial 
contemplative activity, and it is this contemplative activity that in the 
previous section we saw to be central to Hanslick’s account of aesthetic 
appreciation. However, by itself, the fact that our responses to music vary is 
not sufficient to validate the claim that our emotional responses are 
irrelevant to our understanding and aesthetic appreciation of music. What 
Hanslick must show is that all such emotional responses can in principle be 
separated from the music. That is to say that the music is just one of 
potentially many stimuli that can arouse the emotion and could be 
substituted without remainder. For this view to be false, there must be 
examples of aroused emotions that would not in principle occur if one had 
not experienced the music. Malcolm Budd (1985, p.30) suggests that 
amusement is one such example. In this case, the object of one’s amusement 
would be the music, and the music would justifiably be termed amusing so 
long as it produced the appropriate response in us. One could not have had
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that emotion without the object being present. But, as Budd also points out, 
there are some other emotions, such as grief, which both seems to be 
commonly applied to music and yet cannot take the music as its object; one 
would not be grieving about the music. It is in these kinds of cases that it 
becomes hard to see how the emotion could be a genuine property of the 
music, and thus how the aroused emotion could be essentially related to our 
aesthetic evaluation of the music.
It has been widely thought (by accomplished musicians as well as the 
average listener) that music could be in some way representative of 
emotion. This claim can be understood in a number of ways. One way is to 
conceive of music as a kind of language, where certain motifs and structures 
function as signs that refer to non-musical objects or thoughts. The arduous 
task of listing all the meanings of the “atomic” parts of music was famously 
undertaken by Deryck Cooke (1959) in his book The Language o f Music. 
But, music, for Hanslick, can at best be described as a language in a very 
restricted sense. Musical sounds cannot have meaning in the way that the 
words of a natural language do. The only aspects that music and a language 
can be understood to share are dynamic properties.
This thought is captured by Hanslick in his idea of musical “motion”. There 
is an extent to which actions or feelings can be “painted musically” by the 
auditory production of impressions which are dynamically related to 
particular phenomena (Hanslick, 1957, p.37). For example, the rapid heart 
rate and loud abrasive utterances that typically accompany an episode of 
anger can be mimicked in music that is played at a high tempo and includes 
staccato and dissonant notes, as well as jarring harmonies. The problem is 
that while such music might seem apt for accompanying, say a scene of 
anger in a film or on stage, on their own, the properties exhibited by such a 
musical piece are not sufficient to individuate any particular emotion. The
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dynamic properties such as loudness and fast tempo do not constitute an 
emotion. In fact, they are only one part of it and, as such, they may be found 
equally in an emotion of a quite different kind. For example the rapid heart 
rate that we might think essential to a genuine feeling of elation or positive 
anticipation may also be equally typical of some kinds of anger. The key 
problem for the idea that music can be representative of emotion is that 
music is unfit for communicating the often subtle and complicated thoughts 
and meanings, the intentional component, that along with their dynamic 
properties constitutes an emotion. It is this intentional component which, by 
contrast, seems to be communicable only verbally. Emotions incorporate a 
type of definite content that music by way of its dynamic properties alone is 
unsuited to conveying.
Hanslick does not deny that certain formal features of music such as the 
chords, keys or timbres might become associated with other extra-formal 
ideas. In fact, he accepts that this is a common practice. His objection is to 
the idea that, independently of association, the tones and the relations of 
those tones to each other that form a musical composition are in themselves 
directly representative of definite extra-formal entities. As he puts it:
“No instrumental composition can describe the ideas of love, wrath or fear, 
since there is no causal nexus between these ideas and certain combinations 
of sound.” (Hanslick, 1957, p.24)
A question we may raise in connection with this argument is whether 
Hanslick is right to claim that emotions always involve a thought as an 
essential and distinguishing component. Budd (1985) discusses the 
possibility that there may be emotions that are not always associated with a 
particular thought. For instance, Hanslick uses the example of cheerfulness
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as an emotion that cannot be represented in music, but as Budd (1985, pp. 
24-5) points out, cheerfulness:
. .seems rather to be either a quality or character of a mood, which in 
either case consists in being in good spirit, and which does not include a 
specific thought.”
If this is correct then there are perhaps some emotions/moods that escape 
Hanslick’s argument and could potentially be represented in music. If there 
are such emotions without definite thoughts, the dynamic properties of 
music could perhaps pick out or copy that part of the emotion, without 
which the experience would not be emotional, namely the particular sense 
of pleasure or displeasure. Budd suggests that consonance and dissonance in 
musical works might well be capable of sufficiently mimicking the features 
of satisfaction and discomfort. As he describes:
“For dissonance and consonance, understood in the sense of those musical 
sounds that do, and those that do not, stand in need of resolution, give to 
tonal music the movement from tension to resolution that is integral to it. 
And there is a natural correspondence between musical tension and 
resolution, on the one hand, and the experience of dissatisfaction and 
satisfaction, on the other.” (Budd, 1985, p.25)
In the recent literature on emotions in has been contended however, that 
feelings are not sufficient to distinguish between different emotions. 
Emotions are widely understood as being necessarily intentional mental 
states. For example, for it to be true that someone is experiencing grief there 
must be something or someone that they are grieving for. The emotion as 
such includes certain feelings that are directed towards some object or state 
of affairs. Thus when someone verbally expresses their grief at the recent
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death of their dog they are not only trying to communicate how they feel but 
also, what it is their feelings are directed towards. To express an emotion 
seems to involve a communication of not only the nature of one’s feelings 
but also where those feelings are directed.
Viewed another way, the idea that the connection between music and 
emotions should be representational seems rather strange. This becomes 
apparent if we consider the rather straightforward sense according to Budd 
(1995, p. 129) in which music can be representational, when:
“ ...music is successfully intended to sound like the sound of something 
extra-musical”.
However, Budd (1995, p. 129) also explains that:
“In this sense music can represent only sounds or things that make sounds, 
and when it does represent things that make sounds it represents them by 
imitating, more or less closely, in one or more respects, the sounds they 
make. If the listener experiences the music as being a representation, if he 
hears the music as representing the sound of a cuckoo, for example, he hears 
the music as sounding like a cuckoo’s call.”
The idea that music should be understood as representing emotions in this 
sense, seems like the wrong kind of relation anyway. It seems very unlikely 
that we could explain the extremely prevalent and often strongly held 
commitment to music’s being so closely linked to the emotions, simply 
through its loose imitation of them in this way. This also does not seem to 
tally with our actual experience of the emotional content of music, in which 
the emotion itself seems to be a property of the music in some more 
fundamental way than merely a perceived likeness.
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A more promising explanation is that music is expressive of emotion rather 
than representative of it. In this case, the emotions would be in the music in 
some sense, or we would experience the music as having certain emotional 
qualities. Hanslick does in fact allow that we can use emotional terms to 
describe music, but only in a qualified sense. He says that these words are 
only applicable when used in a figurative sense. So, according to Hanslick, 
what we are doing when we use emotional terms with regards to music, is 
suggesting certain analogies between music and emotional states, simply in 
order to pick out certain audible features in it. Hanslick’s point is that the 
emotional terms are replaceable by terms taken from another phenomenal 
scheme, so long as they can be used to indicate the same musical features. 
For example, where we use the terms happy or cheerful to describe a 
passage of music, we could just as well have used bright or bouncy, so long 
as there is some identifiable analogy between the term used and the aspect 
of the music being referred to. And, as Hanslick has made us aware in his 
discussion of representation in music, the only similarity that music and 
emotions can have in common is in their dynamic properties.
An initial worry with this is raised by Budd (1985, p.33). He says that if this 
is true, then our use of terms such as “gloomy” or “proud” must also be used 
to pick out dynamic features of the music. However, such terms are not 
normally used for this purpose. Budd suggests that perhaps the references of 
such terms when applied to music may become clearer when a set of terms 
from a analogous domain are used, allowing the relationships between the 
different uses to aid us in determining what dynamic properties of the music 
they are being used to isolate. It is certainly true that some of our application 
of non-musical terms is intended in this way, and that part of the motivation 
for such an application is to refer to things that do not have names in the 
relevant musical vocabulary. As mentioned above, one typical example is
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the use of “higher” and “lower” to describe pitch relations between notes. 
Similarly, words such as “abrasive” or “silky” are often used to describe the 
timbres of tones. In both cases, there are analogies between the non-musical 
terms and the musical phenomena they are meant to refer to. Interestingly, 
in the case of “higher” and “lower”, the most significant analogy used, this 
is actually something we cannot directly perceive (at least not in normal 
circumstances). The frequency of a bass note does actually oscillate at a 
lower rate than that of a treble note and this phenomenon is just about 
audible if one is presented with an extremely low frequency tone, which is 
then slowly raised in pitch a number of octaves. The “ripples” of the bass 
will begin to merge into one solid tone as the pitch increases. Nonetheless, 
this is something that is more often felt than heard. On Hanslick’s account 
our use of terms such as “higher” or “lower” as well as “cheerful” or “sad”, 
is that we use them in such a way that they make no essential reference to 
what they would normally be used to pick out. For example, when we use 
the word “sad” to describe a piece of music, we are not using the word to 
pick anything like actual sadness, rather it is merely a musical feature that 
we are trying describe and one for which we might just as well have used 
another term such as for example “restrained”, in order to do so.
So for Hanslick, our use of emotion terms is either incorrect or it is entirely 
eliminable. It is inappropriate if we intend “sad” as referring to sadness, and 
it is eliminable if we could have used another term equally well, or 
dispensed altogether with figurative terms and used terms from our musical 
vocabulary that would provide a literal characterisation of the same 
phenomenon (Budd, 1985, p.33). There is, however, a way in which 
emotion terms might be applied in such a way that was ineliminable and yet 
still made no reference to the emotions themselves, and that is if the 
emotion term picks out the purely musical feature in such a way that no 
other term could do so in its place. This might be because there is no term in
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the purely musical vocabulary that can be used literally to describe the 
phenomenon. This view, that emotional terms are always used to attribute a 
purely audible, musical quality, which otherwise lacks a name, is known as 
the “purely sensible description thesis”. Because the purely sensible 
description thesis does not provide us with any independent characterisation 
of the musical phenomenon in question (if they could be provided then the 
emotional terms would be eliminable), we are left with the simple claim that 
this is what we are doing, even if it doesn’t seem to be the case in our 
experience. As Budd acknowledges, there are doubtless times when we do 
use an emotional term just as a way of, perhaps for the sake of brevity, 
referring to some characteristic of the music. Budd suggests (1985, p. 35) 
that:
“ ...when someone says that a certain melody is anguished, for example, he 
might mean only that the melody contains extreme melodic leaps to 
dissonant intervals.”
But, as Budd also points out, it is often not the case that someone intends his 
emotional ascription to the music to be interpreted in this kind of figurative 
way. This becomes especially vivid if we consider our typical claims about 
expressiveness in music. When we describe a passage in a piece of music as 
expressive of sadness, it is not that we use the term “sad” for want of a 
better one. It may be that we can even specify what it is about the music that 
makes it appear sad to us, perhaps it is a slow moving passage in a minor 
key, but we nonetheless intend that the term makes an ineliminable 
reference to the property of sadness. It is in these cases, that the purely 
sensible description thesis does not present a correct account of our use of 
emotion terms when applied to music. As Budd (1985, p. 36) says:
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“Moreover, an ineliminable use of an emotion term appears often to be 
justified: the word ‘sad’, for instance, seems sometimes to be the mot juste, 
rather than a makeshift, intimating, perhaps by analogy, something that has 
nothing specifically to do with sadness. And it is easy to give an 
indisputable example of a justified undeletable use of an emotion term: the 
characterisation of Mozart’s Masonic Funeral Music as mournful -  no 
description of the music in purely audible terms can be substituted for the 
emotional characterisation without losing the point of the emotional 
characterisation.”
The idea that our emotional descriptions of music make an eliminable 
reference to the emotions themselves, does not provide an adequate 
framework for accounting for the nature of our experience of music as 
expressive.
Conclusion
If the purely sensible thesis were correct, and emotional terms are in 
principle (even if not in practice) dispensable, being used to denote what are 
fundamentally purely formal properties of music, then Hanslick’s view that 
the value of music lies solely in music’s form would be justified. There 
would be no genuine link between emotions themselves and the value of 
music. However, when we experience music as expressive, we experience 
the emotion in the music as a property of the music; something over and 
above the compositional arrangements and timbres of the tones themselves. 
Thus, two questions remain. The first is how it is possible to have such an 
experience. If no adequate account can be given, then perhaps we should 
regard the experience of expression as a property of the music as an illusion 
to be dismissed. This was in spirit Hanslick’s view. Assuming that we can 
provide some answer to this first question however, the next question is how
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we should understand the value of our experience of expression in music. I 
will now address these questions.
3. Expression
The view that music is valuable in large part due to its expressive power is 
to be rejected if we can point to an established musical work that is not 
regarded as being expressive of emotion. One example, cited by both Budd 
(1995, p.134) and Kivy (2001, p. 157) is Bach’s Art o f Fugue. In his 
discussion, Kivy alerts us to the fact that the Art o f Fugue has in fact been 
given what he calls a “content interpretation”, that is to say, an 
interpretation that ascribes intentional content. Hans Eggebrecht (1993, p.8) 
is quoted as saying of the Art o f Fugue that:
“Because Bach connected the pitches B-A-C-H to this emphatic cadential 
process, I cannot believe that he only intended to say: ‘I composed this.’ 
Rather, appending the double discant clausula to the B-A-C-H motto seems 
to say, ‘I am identified with the Tonic and it is my desire to reach it.’ 
Interpreted more broadly, this statement could read: ‘Like you I am human.
I am need of salvation; I am certain in the hope of salvation, and have been 
saved by grace.”
If such an interpretation is appropriate, then there seems no obvious reason 
why we should think that a rather more humble interpretation of the The Art 
o f Fugue as expressive of emotion would not be possible. So it is not 
immediately clear that there are pieces of music that simply cannot be heard 
as expressive. Even the “minimalist drone music” of early electronic music 
pioneer Steve Reich has often been regarded as emotionally charged. 
Although I have already touched on the difficulties associated with 
justifying such ascriptions of meaning to music, in virtue of the fact that
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music does not function like a natural language, the situation seems to be 
different when we describe music as expressive of emotion. There is some 
sense in which when we hear music as expressive of joy, we hear the 
emotion as a property of the music, and our use is not (at least not 
conspicuously) figurative. If we can provide an account of expression that 
makes this phenomenon comprehensible then this would also allow us to 
make sense of the idea that we might aesthetically value the music for its 
emotional expressiveness. On the other hand if no adequate account can be 
given of how the emotional aspect might be heard as a property of the music 
as we experience it, then we may feel compelled to relegate music’s 
expressiveness as aesthetically irrelevant, in the way that Hanslick claimed 
we should.
In this part, I will begin by discussing the merits of a selection of views on 
what it could be for music to be expressive. I will then examine in what 
sense expression in music could be considered aesthetically valuable.
3.1. Theories of Musical Expression
In this section, I will consider a number of attempts to explain the 
phenomenon of expression in music. The material will be divided into 
roughly two halves. Firstly, I shall consider those accounts, which appeal to 
an element of resemblance between the music and our emotional states. The 
accounts discussed aim to go a step further than the resemblance account 
considered by Hanslick. I will show that our perceiving of a resemblance 
between an emotional state and music is best understood as part of the 
cause of our experience of that music as expressive, rather than a complete 
account of the experience as such. In the latter half of this section, I will turn 
to consider accounts, which focus on the structure of our experience of
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expression in music, rather than looking to what musical properties could 
justify our having such an experience.
Malcolm Budd (1995), Stephen Davies (1980) and Peter Kivy (1990, 2002) 
have all argued in different ways that at the heart of the musical expression 
of emotion, is a perceived resemblance between the music and our 
emotional life. One advantage of such an account is that it appears to meet 
what Jerrold Levinson has called the “externality requirement” of musical 
expressiveness. He explains the externality requirement as follows:
“Musical expressiveness should be seen to belong unequivocally to the 
music -  to be a property of aspect thereof -  and not to the listener or 
performer or composer.” (Levinson, 1996, p.91)
The externality requirement requires that a correct analysis of expression in 
music is one which does not locate the emotion purely in the subjective 
experiences of the listener. The account should do justice to the idea that the 
emotions are a property of the music. Malcolm Budd’s theory of the musical 
expression of emotion is anchored around what he calls the “basic or 
minimal concept” of musical expression (1995, p. 136). However, by itself 
the minimal concept is insufficient to account for all forms of experience 
that expression in music can take. Accordingly, Budd argues that we 
experience the expression of emotion in music in a number of different 
ways, which all have the minimal conception as their common ground. 
Budd (1995, p. 137) defines the minimal concept in the following way:
“The basic and minimal concept of the musical expression of emotion 
comes to this: when you hear music as being expressive of emotion E -  
when you hear E in the music -  you hear the music as sounding like the way 
E feels; the music is expressive of E if it is correct to hear it in this fashion
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or a full appreciation of the music requires the listener to hear it this way. So 
the sense in which you hear the emotion in the music -  the sense in which it 
is an audible property of the music -  is that you perceive a likeness between 
the music and the experience of the emotion.”
The minimal concept thus rests on one’s perceiving, either consciously or 
unconsciously, a cross-categorial resemblance between the sounds that 
make up the music and the distinctive “feeling” component of an emotion. 
However, Budd’s concept of feeling in this instance does not refer simply to 
a bodily sensation. Budd is conscious of making sure that the aspect of the 
emotion being captured by the music is one that has an ineliminable 
connection to the emotion. Hence, the proposed resemblance is not between 
the music and a plain physical sensation, but rather to something more 
integral to a type of emotion; namely, the specific way the emotion feels to 
the person who experiences it. However, there is some difficulty in 
understanding exactly what this “feeling” is and where it should be located 
in the structure of an emotion. This is a problem as if we cannot articulate 
the nature of the two elements in the resemblance then the whole idea 
remains a mystery. In addition, the precise nature of the possible similarities 
will determine just which emotions can be expressed by music. If an 
emotion lacks a distinctive feeling then music will not be able to resemble it 
in any way that distinguishes it from another emotion resembled in music. 
Also, if an emotion contains a feeling component that music has no possible 
analogue for, then it cannot be expressed at all. Budd provides the following 
explanation of what he means by the way an emotion feels. He writes:
“The feelings intrinsic to the experience of the emotions are, by and large, 
types of felt desire and aversion (as with envy and disgust or shame), 
distress (as with fear or grief), pleasure (as with joy or, amusement or pride) 
and displeasure, especially displeasure at the frustration of a desire (as with
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anger). The feeling of an emotion is often complex, consisting of more than 
one of these elements.” (Budd, 1995, p. 140)
When the feelings Budd talks about are described in this way, as “types of 
felt desire and aversion”, Budd seems to be locating them somewhere in 
between the bodily sensations and the intentional or cognitive part of an 
emotion. The problem is that for the minimal conception to be of any use we 
need the resemblance between music and the emotion to extend from the 
music to something in the emotion that can serve to individuate at least the 
kind of emotion it is. This would be to express an as yet unspecified instance 
of an emotion, by which I mean something analogous to how we could 
recognise an angry face without knowing what the anger is directed at. That 
dynamic properties can to some degree resemble the dynamic properties of 
some plain bodily sensations such as rapid heart rate, everyone, including 
Hanslick, would be ready to admit. However, the bare audible properties of 
the music cannot resemble anything like the intentional content of the 
emotion and this Budd (1995, p. 141) acknowledges when he says:
“The belief or thought, if any, that forms an emotion’s core (how the world 
is represented as being); the content of any component desire (how the 
world is represented as desired) or of any affect (what is found distressing, 
dispiriting or reason for joy); the nature and location of that in which a 
movement or some other bodily change is felt; these are all features that 
music cannot mirror.”
So it is difficult to understand how music can resemble the kind of feeling 
component that Budd wants it to. The tension arises when we try to construe 
the feeling component as anything more than representative of bodily 
sensations. Budd seems to accept that this is the case. He also acknowledges 
that once the intentional content of an emotional experience is removed,
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little is left by means of which different emotions can be individuated. This 
he claims is reflected in:
. .the severe limitation of music’s capacity to express our highly 
variegated inner lives.” (Budd, 1995, p. 141)
The minimal concept may appear to allowing little more, if anything, than 
Hanslick did in his concession of the dynamic properties of music being 
analogous to some characteristic aspects of emotional episodes. However, it 
does crucially appeal to a relation of resemblance that is closer to the 
essential nature of an emotion than just the bodily manifestations of emotion 
that Hanslick linked to the dynamic properties of music. It is the mirroring 
of the felt aversions and desires that might be distinctive of kinds of 
emotion, but this stops short of being able to provide an indication of what 
the object of the emotion might be. Budd claims that the minimal 
conception of expression undermines two claims that threaten the idea that 
emotional qualities are relevant to the aesthetic value of a piece of music. 
The first is that one is inevitably mistaken if one thinks there is any sense in 
which the emotion could be a property of the music. The second claim is 
that even if we concede that music’s expressive qualities are not just in the 
mind of the listener, nonetheless, no listener is in a position to know which 
emotion is actually being expressed (Budd, 1995, p. 146). Budd argues that 
that the minimal conception is enough to reject both kinds of objections. He 
writes:
“For although the heard resemblances do reside in the ear of the listener, the 
resemblances are there to be heard, open to anyone with cultivated ears; and 
the heard resemblances that constitute the musical expression of emotion are 
not fortuitous but are due to the composer’s understanding and manipulation 
of his musical resources. Furthermore, as I have indicated, the basis of these
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resemblances is often accessible to consciousness, so that our judgements 
about the emotional qualities of music, which lay claim to intersubjective 
validity, are not free-floating but can be given a solid ground.” (Budd, 1995, 
p. 146)
What is crucial is that we accept the claim that the way emotions feel is 
distinctive enough to link the way music sounds to at least some kinds of 
emotions, if perhaps not to any particular emotion. This as we have seen is 
where Budd thinks the expressive resources of music run dry, music can 
only express broad categories of emotions through its limited scope for 
resembling how they feel.
Saam Trivedi (2001) has raised doubts as to whether the basic and minimal 
concept can qualify as a concept of expression at all. Trivedi argues that an 
account of musical expressiveness in being a type of expressiveness in 
general, must relate intelligibly to our ordinary concept of expressiveness.
In addition, Trivedi points out that a theory of musical expression should be 
consonant with what it ordinarily means to be expressive. Trivedi (2001, 
p.412) rightly describes our ordinary concept of expressiveness as 
involving:
“.. .the outward manifestation of inner mental states.”
However, the minimal concept, understood as the perceiving of a likeness 
between properties of the music and the way emotions feel, is not consonant 
with our everyday concept of expressiveness, and is as Trivedi (2001, 
p.412) says:
“...too minimal to be a basic concept of musical expressiveness.”
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However, Budd did not intend the minimal conception to be an exhaustive 
account of the experience of expression; it was simply intended to be the 
one common factor among a variety of actual experiences, which differ in 
other ways. He suggests three accretions to the minimal concept. The first is 
when, in addition to perceiving the resemblance, one experiences an 
instance of the emotion being aroused in oneself. The second addition is that 
rather than undergoing the emotion, one imagines that one experiences the 
emotion. The difference between this and the first addition is analogous to 
seeing and visualising. The third accretion that Budd acknowledges is to 
imagine that the music actually is an instance of the feeling. We are not 
involved in this kind of experience, but imagine that it is the expression of 
the emotion had by the music itself; we experience the emotion as belonging 
to an imaginary musical persona. The overriding point is that there is no one 
correct account of the experience of expression in music and that the 
different conceptions available are not competitors.
It is by incorporating the three accretions to the minimal concept that we 
might bridge the gap between Budd’s basic theory and our everyday 
understanding of expression. In these three cases, we do imagine that the 
music is the outward manifestation of either our own state or that of a 
fictitious musical persona. However, there is a problem in that the minimal 
concept is nonetheless intended to be the fundamental aspect of the 
experience and a point that Trivedi raises, is that resemblance is not part of 
our experience of expression. As Trivedi (2001, p.412) says:
“The mere fact that something cross-categorially resembles how emotions 
feel, and that these likenesses are perceived, does not show that the thing is 
thereby expressive, nor that it should be, or is, seen to be so.”
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Trivedi illustrates this by pointing out that the fact that snails and turtles 
move slowly, which resembles how sad people move, is not enough to show 
that the slow movement of snails and turtles is expressive of sadness, neither 
their own, nor anyone else’s. Trivedi’s example can be accused of 
misrepresenting Budd’s notion of resemblance involved in the minimal 
concept however. As Budd himself points out, the . .perception of a 
likeness is a matter of degree” (Budd, 1995, p. 137), and this explains how 
pieces of music can be more or less expressive of emotion. A piece of music 
which resembles the way emotions feel only in virtue of its slowness would 
be unlikely to qualify as expressive and any connection between the 
slowness of the music and the emotion of sadness would probably not be 
perceived in any case. Surely, the kind of resemblance that Budd has in 
mind between the music and the way emotions feel is significantly closer 
than that. Nonetheless, the problem with the notion of resemblance as a 
sufficient base for expression can be pressed further. In his discussion of 
Kivy’s (1989) account of resemblance, Derek Matravers (2003) raises an 
issue similar to that which Trivedi raises in relation to Budd’s minimal 
account. The issue is that if one takes the hearing of a resemblance (to 
whatever degree of similarity) to be part of the content of one’s experience 
of expression, then one is open to an objection such as Aaron Ridley’s.
(Note that by “melisma”, Ridley (1995, p. 75) means “Intention-neutral 
resemblance that music may bear to the human voice”.) Ridley (1995, 
p. 121) describes how:
“Melisma itself isn’t expressive -  it only resembles something expressive. 
Thus while melisma may well be responsible for our experience of music as 
expressive, it cannot by itself explain what it is to experience music as 
expressive. To offer an account of musical expressiveness wholly in terms 
of melisma, then, would be like offering an account of pictorial space 
wholly in terms of the perspectival devices contained by a picture: it might
53
be true that we experience pictorial space in virtue of the pictorial devices 
that a picture contains; but the experience itself is not merely the experience 
of perceiving perspectival devices (which could be done without ever 
experiencing pictorial space.)”
The objection to the idea of resemblance explaining musical expression is 
that to whatever degree it occurs, resemblance alone is neither sufficient for 
defining what it means for something to be expressive, nor an elucidation of 
our experience of expression. It is not the case that something is expressive 
of something simply because it resembles (or represents) it, and when we 
experience music as expressive, we do not merely perceive it as the 
representation of something else that is expressive.
Stephen Davies’ (1980) account of expression also cites a type of 
resemblance as being central. Unlike Budd’s account which locates the 
resemblance to something internal to the experience of emotion, Davies’ 
account focuses on what he calls “emotion characteristics in appearance” 
(Davies, 1980, p.69). These are the visible features that we ordinarily 
associate with the paradigm cases of expression, such as facial expression, 
gait and other observable kinds of behaviour. However, if we take Davies’ 
account as one that attempts to provide a characterisation of our experience 
of expression as one that is exhausted by the perceiving of a resemblance, 
then this falls foul of Ridley’s objection above. But, in any case, as 
Matravers points out, the perceiving of a resemblance does not seem to be 
anything like what we typically experience. He says:
“The canonical description of the concert goer is surely not that of hearing 
resemblances between the music and the expressive demeanour of people, 
even if we assume it is possible to make sense of such a description.” 
(Matravers, 2003, p.356)
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Kivy (1989, p.258) wants us to understand the point about resemblance as 
one that is more aimed at explaining the cause or ground of our experience 
of expression, rather than the nature of experience itself However, the 
resemblance itself is not exhaustive of the whole of the cause of our 
experience of expression. Kivy acknowledges that there must be more than 
just resemblance that causes us to recognise and experience the music as 
expressive rather than just as resembling something else. Part of the 
motivation for this claim is the difficulty that we face in accounting for the 
generally accepted “emotive” qualities of musical features that do not 
incorporate the kind of dynamic properties that are usually thought to be the 
basis of the heard resemblances; these include phenomena such as the major 
and minor keys (and in particular the chords), which are typically referred to 
as “happy” and “sad” respectively, but in themselves have no dynamic 
differences. For Kivy, these aspects of music carry a kind of emotive charge 
which, through a process of acculturation and association, we have invested 
in them. Thus it is the combination of resemblance and certain learned 
associations that result in our “animating” the music. This animation of the 
music:
“ .. .leads us to perceive the expressive quality as a phenomenal property of 
the music”. (Matravers, 2003, p.354)
However, Kivy’s claim about our tendencies to animate the music doesn’t 
enlighten us as to the nature of our experience of this phenomenon. We also 
need a separate account of the “animation” itself if we are to make sense of 
how it is possible that the music itself can be experienced as expressive. 
Kivy attempts to shed light on this question by claiming that hearing music 
as expressive is analogous to two perceptual phenomena. The first is 
Wollheim’s notion of “seeing in” and the second is Wittgenstein’s of aspect 
perception. Seeing in is described by Matravers (2003, p.355) as the:
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. .distinctive capacity such that an aspect of our experience of 
differentiated surface is a visual experience of an absent object in the 
surface.”
Seeing the face of Jesus in a cloud would be an example of “seeing in”. 
However, it does not seem that this gets us any nearer to our goal of 
understanding the experience of expression. In the context of expression, 
this would be understood as something like hearing the expression in the 
music and this is what needs explaining.
Matravers argues that the analogy with aspect perception is also unhelpful. 
The problem is that it is unclear exactly what it is about aspect perception in 
other cases that could be compared to expression in music. A standard 
example of aspect perception in pictorial representation is the duck/rabbit 
case. In this common example, the experienced object remains the same, but 
our experience of it changes between that of seeing a picture of a rabbit and 
that of a duck. The thought is that the phenomenology of the experience of 
expression is reflected in the paradigm cases of aspect perception and the 
duck/rabbit example is one such case. But, as Matravers points out in a more 
recent paper on the same topic, it is not obvious exactly how the comparison 
can be made. He writes:
“It cannot be the relation between the figure and what it is seen as: in both 
cases, that is the relation of pictorial representation, and all (including Kivy) 
agree that expression is not an instance of that. It must be, rather, that the 
way in which we process the figure (either as a duck picture or as a rabbit- 
picture) has a phenomenological upshot. Analogously, the way in which we 
process the music has a phenomenological upshot: we hear it as expressive. 
However, we hardly needed the analogy with aspect perception to tell us 
that.” (Matravers 2007, p. 101)
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One problem with the proposed analogy is that in the duck/rabbit example, 
the change in our experience occurs within only one phenomenal realm: that 
of pictorial representation. It is not that the example is illustrating the 
transition from a state of non-representation to a state of actual 
representation. Rather, the example illustrates how, when we are presented 
with an ambiguous figure, we are capable of seeing it one way and then 
another, but not both at the same time. Another such example would be that 
of the Necker cube. By recognising that the lines drawn on the page 
represent a three dimensional cube in space we are able alternately to 
imagine that the line we see in the middle of the diagram is the edge that 
marks the back of the cube or the one that marks the front. The appropriate 
analogy with the experience of expression in music would be to hear a piece 
of music as expressive of, say, first sadness and then subsequently anger.
We might find the music ambiguous in regard to what it is expressive of and 
thus be able to hear it one way or another depending on how we focus our 
attention. In his description of the process of aspect perception, Barrie Faulk 
(1993, p.55-73) writes:
“To possess the concepts “duck” and “rabbit” is (among other things) for 
the terms to be elicited from one by a wide variety of visual presentations, 
which allows for differences in the animal’s posture, angle from which they 
are viewed and so on. When therefore the drawing activates one or the other 
concept, the effect will be to locate it within (and connect it to) different 
ranges of permissible variations. Furthermore, each concept is related to 
other concepts that apply to parts of an animal -  “beak,” “floppy ears” and 
so on. The activation of these by component parts of the drawing will have 
the same variation-determining effect: seen as ears, for instance, the two 
protuberances can occupy a set of further positions relative to one another 
which is not possible if they are seen as a rigid beak.”
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Faulk describes the process underlying aspect perception in pictorial 
representation as one in which certain concepts we possess are “activated” 
as a result of our seeing the picture. When we perceive certain groupings in 
our visual stimulus (which may be more or less obvious), we recognise that 
those groupings qualify as falling under the permissible variations of our 
concept “duck- picture”, for example. It should be kept in mind that exactly 
what it takes to qualify as a permissible instance of “duck-picture” is 
another question, the answer to which must to a significant extent depend on 
the condition of the subject. This process of concept activation through the 
recognition of a visual pattern or grouping is, it seems to me, 
straightforwardly analogous to the relevant experience of expression in 
music: the experience of hearing something as ambiguously expressive of 
two different things. On one hand, when we listen to a piece of music we 
find that it is expressive of sadness because the notes for whatever reason 
provide us with that experience, and on the other hand when we direct our 
attention in a different way towards those same notes, perhaps by 
recognising different groupings for example, we come to hear that same 
piece of music as being expressive of fear. Thus, there is no problem with 
understanding that there is something analogous to aspect perception in our 
experience of expression in music. Unfortunately the aim of the comparison 
was meant to be a clarification of the structure and nature of the experience 
of expression in general and not to show us that the expressive quality of the 
same piece of music may vary according to how we might manipulate and 
interpret our perceptual experience.
The thought that the state of the listener might play a significant part in their 
experience of music as expressive is explicitly incorporated in Levinson’s 
account. Levinson (1996, p. 107) states his view of musical expressiveness 
as follows:
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“A passage of music P is expressive of an emotion or other psychic 
condition E iff P, in context, is readily and aptly heard by an appropriately 
backgrounded listener as the expression of E, in a sui generis, “musical” 
manner, by an indefinite agent, the music’s persona.”
Some things that initially draw our attention with Levinson’s definition are 
that he, unlike some of the other theorists we have looked at, does not 
include an explicit reference to anything that could be understood to be the 
cause of our experience of expression. For instance, Levinson makes no 
mention of the idea of resemblance. Instead, he focuses on what we mean 
when say that a piece of music is expressive; what the structure of the 
experience is like. However, there are some terms in his definition that 
require elucidation before the overall theory can be evaluated. The persona 
in Levinson’s sense is an imaginary being, not to be confused with the 
various other genuine persons who might be involved with the production of 
the music, such as the composer, performer or the listener themselves. As 
Levinson (1996, p.107) says, the music’s persona is “ .. .the subject of an 
imaginary act of expression we hear as going on then and there”. As 
regards the “sui generis musical manner”, by this Levinson means not a 
specifically musical emotion or other such psychological state that might be 
peculiar to music, but the expression of a standard emotion in a specifically 
musical way. Levinson wants to avoid once again the notion that it is some 
specific person such as the composer who might be expressing his own 
emotions by using his musical skill. For Levinson, the way we experience 
expression in music is natural and intuitive. The musical persona is 
expressing an emotional (or other psychological) state in the music and not 
as we might literally imagine a composer expressing himself musically 
while sitting at the piano, for example. Probably the most important aspect 
of Levinson’s view is the notion of the expressive content of a piece of
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music being something that is heard by a backgrounded listener in a 
particular context. A backgrounded listener is someone who:
. .is conversant with the style of the music and its inherent range of 
expression, with the natures and potentialities of the instruments employed, 
with the general aims of the composers of the period, with the structural and 
aesthetic norms of the genre of music involved, and so on.” (Levinson,
1996, p. 107)
Levinson’s definition of a backgrounded listener invites a number of 
questions. For instance, how would one determine the “inherent range of 
expression” of the style of music? Are styles restricted to expressing only 
certain emotions? Presumably, we would be in some sense mistaken if we 
heard an emotion in the music that was not part of this range, or is this range 
only a guideline? It would prove too much of a diversion to attempt to 
answer these questions here. However, one thing that does emerge from 
Levinson’s initial outline, is that he places significant weight not only on the 
conditions of the listener but also the context within which the music is 
heard. On Levinson’s view, the experience of the expressiveness of a piece 
of music is determined by much more than just the purely audible features 
of the music. This is reflected in Levinson’s understanding of musical 
context, which includes not just the “intra-musical” context, where this is 
understood in the sense that a particular musical passage may be located 
within the overall context of the piece as a whole, but also what he calls the 
“extra-musical” context, which Levinson (1996, p. 107) describes as one that 
is:
“ .. .constituted by the individual and general style in which the given work 
is embedded, as well as the surrounding environment of preceding musical 
works of that and other composers.”
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Music’s “ready-perceivability-as-expression” (Levinson, 1996, p. 108) 
depends on our being psychologically prepared in the appropriate way. This 
is a topic that I shall return to in part four. The question that is of concern in 
this part is whether Levinson’s account of the experience is correct. At first 
glance, there are some important points in its favour. The idea that the music 
is the expression of an unspecified persona fits well with our conventional 
understanding of expression in everyday cases. The music is expressive in a 
way that is analogous to the expressiveness of a physical gesture or vocal 
utterance. Also, by shifting the focus of the account from expression as 
dependent on perceived resemblances to the phenomenological nature of the 
experience, we are not lured into the difficult position of trying to imagine 
the causes of our experience as part of the content of our experience 
(although we should note that an appeal to resemblance may well figure in 
the explanation of the inherent range of expression of a style of music).
Both Trivedi (2001) and Matravers (2003) have criticised Levinson’s view 
of musical expressiveness. However, both writers have also acknowledged 
that there is much to commend in Levinson’s analysis. Trivedi, for example, 
criticises Levinson’s theory only to the extent that while he feels that it 
encompasses some prominent instances of the experience of expression, it 
does not cover them all. In particular, Trivedi argues that there is another 
experience that Levinson does not cover and that this other experience is (at 
least in Trivedi’s experience) the primary form that music as expression 
takes. This is that we make-believedly animate the music. When we listen to 
music, we make-believedly bring the music to life in our minds so that we 
hear the music both as the expression of emotion and that which has the 
emotion which is being expressed (as opposed to the music being the 
expressive medium of an imaginary persona). Trivedi argues that this 
instance of expression does not rule out the other kinds, such as Levinson’s 
imaginary persona, but it is in fact the most common experience and allows
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us to understand why we are disposed to say that the emotion is a property 
of the music, that it is “in” the music. In a similar way to Budd’s proposal, 
Trivedi suggests a disjunctive account of musical expressiveness that 
encompasses at least three types of experience.
The kind of experience that Trivedi (2001, p.415) envisages involves the 
following claims:
“(i) We imagine the music is the kind of thing that is alive; (ii) we imagine 
that it is the kind of thing that has psychological states; (iii) we imagine the 
music itself is sad or joyous (or whatever state it is appropriate to imagine 
the music as possessing); and (iv) we imagine that the music is an audible 
thing or an audible being that expresses its sadness or joy by presenting an 
aural appearance apprehended aurally. It should be noted that we make 
believe the music is sad without making believe, or without having to make 
believe, that the music has complex, functional organisational states of the 
sort that seem necessary, according to currently orthodox theories of mind, 
for it to have psychological states.”
For Trivedi, this kind of experience is a better example, than say Levinson’s 
theory, of how the expression of emotion, and moreover the emotion itself, 
can be understood as a property of the music itself. The idea is that this kind 
of making believe is the same sort of phenomenon that occurs when a child 
pretends that a piece of wood is a truck. Trivedi says that our animating of 
the music in this sense is similar to the way in which we animate other 
inanimate objects such as when we imagine that a cartoon picture of a car is 
something that both has psychological states and also expresses them. The 
key thought is that expressiveness is like a tertiary property of the music. 
Trivedi (2001, p.416) writes:
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“A musical passage or piece is sad (or is expressive of sadness) if competent 
listeners (those who are musically sensitive, informed to some minimal 
degree, and so on) are disposed, under standard conditions (they are not 
bored or tired or distracted or satiated by the music, and so on), to hear it as 
make-believedly sad (or as make-believedly expressive of sadness).”
Trivedi considers a number of objections to this view but I shall consider 
only what I think is the most significant. The objection puts pressure on the 
analogy drawn between our typical instances of animation and the proposed 
animation of music. With the typical instances of our animating things, be 
they comic book cars, trees, blocks of wood, etc., all of these things are 
“stable substances”, things that can be frozen in time and captured in their 
entirety. Music, on the other hand, is a temporal art. It exists in its entirely 
only over a period of time. Thus it is more akin to a process than an 
independently specifiable object. Trivedi’s response to this criticism is to 
suggest something like a process ontology. He suggests that we can:
. .view the sun, trees, and indeed many other everyday things as processes 
that are subject to constant, even if slow and imperceptible, change” 
(Trivedi, 2001, p.418).
It is unclear that recourse to this kind of view is enough to convince us that 
everyday objects and pieces of music can be understood as the same kind of 
entity. We do not understand the experience of the perception of a tree as 
something that is essentially temporal in the way we do a piece of music, 
and this fundamental difference remains whether or not we manage to 
convince ourselves to adopt certain other awkward metaphysical views. 
However, the discussion of the ontological status of music is in any case 
unnecessary. All that needs to be appealed to in this instance is the 
experience itself and it is here that I think Trivedi’s claim that we animate
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the music is close to the mark. In a similar way to that in which we perceive 
a person and their behaviour at one and the same time, we hear the music 
and its behaviour simultaneously. The notable thing is that we never 
perceive the music as a static entity; it is always going somewhere and as 
soon as it arrives, it disappears. Thus, Trivedi’s view does not seem 
implausible as an addition to Levinson’s account of the experience of 
expression in music.
Matravers’ (2003, p.357) complaint against Levinson is that there is:
“ .. .a general worry as to whether we can really grasp what it is that we are 
being asked to imagine.”
Matravers (2003, p.357) continues:
“Taking the worst case, we are being asked to identify in imagination the 
music and the expressing of an emotion by a persona. We have no 
experience of such an identification in the actual world, and no mechanism 
is imagined.”
Matravers doubts that the imaginative experience we are being asked to 
compare with our own experiences of musical expression is difficult to 
evaluate. He puts this partly down to the lack of a theory of the imagination 
capable of clearly defining its role and limits. However, as is inevitably the 
case when we attempt to analyse certain kinds of experience, the only way 
in which it can be tested is by comparing them to those that we have 
experienced firsthand ourselves. It is here that most will find that the 
experience Levinson describes is not unlike those that they do, at least on 
occasion, have when listening to music. However, as we have seen, there is 
little reason to think that Levinson’s theory is exhaustive.
64
Matravers wants to defend a dispositionalist account of expression in music, 
whereby the expressive content of a piece of music depends on what 
emotions or other psychological states are aroused in the listener when they 
hear the music. In particular, he wants to defend such an account from the 
typical objection that the dispositional account locates the expression and 
the emotion in the mind of the listener, a violation of Levinson’s externality 
requirement.
There is no space to explore all elements of Matravers’ theory here, but I do 
wish to explain how his account aims to do justice to the experience of 
expression. Matravers appeals to a theory by Kendal Walton. Walton thinks 
that the experience of expression in music can involve imaginative 
introspection coupled with an identification of one’s own imagined feelings 
with the experience of the music. He writes:
“I propose that, although music does not in general call for imaginative 
hearing or imaginative perceiving, it often does call for imaginative 
introspecting. We mentioned the possibility that music is expressive by 
virtue of imitating behavioural expressions of feeling. Sometimes this is so, 
and sometimes a passage imitates or portrays vocal expressions of feelings. 
When it does, listeners probably imagine (not necessarily consciously and 
certainly not deliberately) themselves hearing someone’s vocal expressions. 
But in other cases they may instead imagine themselves introspecting, being 
aware of their own feelings.” (Walton, 1988, p.359)
Levinson criticises the idea that someone is having an experience of his own 
feelings of an emotion. Levinson thinks that this view is implausible 
because it is unlikely that a person is capable of introspection while 
listening to music. He says:
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“First, it is implausible to suggest that a listener introspects his auditory 
sensations while listening; just attending to the musical substance of music 
of an complexity is enough of a task to preclude much in the way of 
simultaneous introspection on the side. Second, it is implausible to suggest 
that we imagine anything about such sensations, even were we to attend to 
them introspectively. Third, even if we did imagine something of them, it is 
implausible to suggest that it would be that having such sensations was the 
experiencing o f emotion, because there is hardly more similarity between 
the experiencing of emotions and the introspecting of auditory sensations 
than between the experiencing of emotions and the hearing of music.” 
(Levinson, 1996, p.94)
But Levinson’s (1996, p.94) main objection is that:
“ .. .it casts the activity of perceiving musical expressiveness in too 
egocentric a light: it represents expression in music as in effect the 
expression of the listener’s own, albeit imaginary, feelings. But 
expressiveness in music, I would insist, is something we encounter 
fundamentally as residing “out there,” as existing exterior to our own 
minds.”
The point is that even if we have a strong empathetic response to the music, 
the expression of emotion is still meant to be understood, by all listeners, as 
something that is in the music first and foremost.
There are a number of points that we can draw from the preceding 
discussion of theories of musical expression. The first and most obvious is 
that from what we have seen, there is no one theory that covers all the 
possible experiences of expression in music. As Matravers (2007, p.l 13) 
says:
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“Each of these [theories such as Levinson’s and Budd’s discussed above] 
could be an account of what it is for a listener to experience music as 
expressive. However, what they aspire to be is what it is for music to be 
expressive.”
While I think Levinson’s view captures much of how we perceive 
expression when we hear music, it nonetheless leaves out some experiences, 
which on reflection, seem too important to neglect. These would include the 
animation of the music as something that both has and expresses emotion (a 
la Kivy and Trivedi). The overriding sense is that expression in music 
cannot be captured in one kind of experience and we are left with the 
inevitable task of compiling a disjunctive list. However, there are some 
positive points that emerge from the discussion. One is that there are ways 
in which we can make sense of the idea that we perceive expression as a 
property of the music. This means that we can respond to the claim that 
because expression cannot be coherently conceived as a property of music, 
it is thus not admissible as an aesthetic quality. The other main point of 
interest is that expressiveness is akin to a tertiary property. Levinson and 
Kivy (and also to some extent Matravers, see 2007, p.l 13) stress that in 
order for a listener to hear music as expressing emotional states, they must, 
to use Levinson’s phrase, be “appropriately backgrounded”. The condition 
of the listener, in particular what I shall call their musical understanding, 
exerts an inescapable influence over the experience of music as expressive. I 
shall discuss this further in part four. The final point is that the experience of 
expression in music, at least in the vast majority of cases, makes significant 
use of our imaginative powers. I shall consider some of the effects of this 
aspect in the next section.
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3.2. Expression and Aesthetic Value
The value of expression in art has typically been held in high regard. One 
notable example is Collingwood’s (1947) theory according to which the 
defining characteristic of art is that it is the expression of emotion. On 
Collingwood’s account, we express ourselves through the creation of art and 
are rewarded with a profoundly pleasurable sense of emotional release. For 
Tolstoy, where the aim of art is to express morally elevating thoughts, the 
expressive power of a work is directly linked to its value as a piece of art. 
The clearer the thought is presented to us or the more strongly the emotion 
is aroused, the more expressively powerful the work. One problem with any 
theory of the aesthetic value of expression that takes its cue from an arousal 
theory of expression is that of the value of art which expresses negative 
emotions like grief (although this is not a problem that Tolstoy’s theory 
faces in that he deplored the expression of negative emotions outright). If 
the piece is only expressive of the emotion because it is aroused in ourselves 
then it can seem baffling as to why we should want to seek out such an 
experience. As Roger Scruton (1998, p.57) says:
“To describe a piece of music as expressive of melancholy is to give a 
reason for listening to it; to describe it as arousing or evoking melancholy is 
to give a reason for avoiding it.”
While the value of expression may seem clear from the point of view of the 
artist, it is less clear why we value the expressive properties as for example 
when we hear a passage of melancholy music. Nonetheless, there seems to 
be an undisputable sense that the expressive qualities of music are 
something to be valued by the listener. As Alan Goldman (1992, p.360) 
says:
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“Romanticism aside, expression or expressiveness is indisputably a source 
of value to call a piece deeply poignant, powerful, or even vividly angry is, 
other things equal, to praise it. Even music that expresses primarily negative 
emotions, such as anger or sorrow, may be greatly prized for its 
effectiveness in conveying these feelings.”
We have already considered the idea that expression is to be accounted for 
in terms of representation (as resemblance) and found it to be unsatisfactory. 
However, representation, or at least how something is represented, would 
have seemed perhaps a likely source of aesthetic value. For example we 
regularly praise works of pictorial art for the way in which they represent 
their subject matter. Perhaps, then, one approach to making sense of why 
expressive qualities would be of interest to us, would be in relation to how 
we perceive them in the real world. The problem is that as we have also 
seen, the ability of music to express definite emotional states is restricted 
compared to other art forms or expressive mediums like language. 
Accordingly, Aaron Ridley (1995, p75) claims that if we focus on the idea 
of expression in music as resembling outward manifestations of emotion, 
such as we would in the theories of Kivy and Davies, the value of the 
experience is difficult to fathom. Kivy has suggested that we should 
understand the emotive qualities of music as playing a kind of structural role 
and adhering to a kind of syntax, in much the same way that musical events, 
which were discussed in reference to the hypothesis and hide-and-seek 
games, also follow certain rules, or a musical syntax. But, Kivy does claim 
that emotions in music are essentially valuable. He says:
“I take it as a truism that emotive properties of music, like other of its 
artistically relevant properties, are inherently interesting properties. That is 
to say, they are properties of music that add to its aesthetic character, and 
are inherently pleasurable to experience. But, furthermore, like other heard,
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aesthetic properties of music, they help constitute the sonic pattern. Patterns 
whether sonic or visual, are a matter of repetition and contrast.” (Kivy,
1990, p.91)
If we turn our attention to the inward resemblance and the imaginative 
experience, as, for example, with Malcolm Budd’s view that music sounds 
the way emotions feel, then there is a sense in which the expressive quality 
of music can be identified with the kinds of mental states we value. The 
value of this experience is then inseparable from the value of the experience 
of the music. As Budd (1995, p. 154) says:
“On the one hand, the mere perception of a likeness between the music and 
an emotion constitutes at most a minimal enhancement of the experience of 
hearing music, perhaps none at all. The basic and minimal sense of the 
musical expression of emotion does not in itself constitute an aesthetic 
value: it does not automatically endow music that accords with it an 
aesthetic value; the aesthetically sensitive listener can perceive an emotion 
in music (in the cross categorial likeness sense) and yet be aesthetically 
unaffected by the perception. On the other hand, the musically based 
imagination of emotion sometimes enables the listener to experience 
imaginatively (or really) the inner nature of emotional states in a peculiarly 
vivid, satisfying and poignant form. ”
If we value the experience of expression in music as Budd describes it, we 
once again incur the problem of how we could value the expression of 
negative emotions if they are something that we are actually made to feel. 
There have been many suggested solutions to this problem which go back as 
far as Aristotle, who suggested that the experience of tragic drama enabled 
us to vent our negative emotions through the experience of them in a 
controlled environment where they could be directed at fictitious objects.
70
The result would be that we would leave the auditorium emotionally better 
equipped to meet the demands of society. Other suggestions include the idea 
that we simply enjoy being emotionally excited, regardless of the nature of 
the emotion. There is also the claim that the experience of negative 
emotions provides a kind of learning experience where we come to 
understand their particular natures all the more intimately. This latter view, 
while perhaps true in many cases, does not seem to do justice to the majority 
of our experiences of the expression of emotion and there is little evidence 
to suggest that we value the experience of the expressive power of music 
because it helps with our emotional development; there would surely be 
much better means of doing that, if it really was what we valued.
One thing that does seem to be of significant value in both the experience of 
form as well as expression in music is the kind of imaginative exercise that 
it encourages. For example, Budd (1995, p. 155) notes that the imaginative 
experience of emotion in music is also partly a surrendering of autonomy of 
the un-aided imagination which allows its course to be influenced by the 
creation of the composer. As the saying goes, the music takes you on an 
imaginative journey. The purely musical imaginative journey is different to 
the imaginative experience that one has with a work of literature for 
example. Because the musical experience is less defined in not being able to 
communicate any definite intentional content, the autonomy of the 
imagination is not surrendered to quite the same extent. As I think it is the 
case with all art-forms, as they veer more towards the abstract and become 
less reliant on the representational, more imaginative contribution is 
required from the listening or viewing subject. Works of abstract art, are 
often highly praised when they encourage profound imaginative experiences 
of the aesthetic qualities of the work. The imaginative experience is not 
distinct from the work, to forestall any objections to the effect that the work 
is somehow redundant; rather it is an imaginative experience of the work
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itself. As the experience of expression is less definite in music than it is in 
other art forms, so correspondingly it requires more imaginative 
contribution, but at the same time allows more imaginative freedom, than 
other arts. Sometimes the effect of hearing a piece of expressive music, as it 
moves through time, is as of a mirror reflecting the temporal unfolding of 
our own emotional states. But, as Goldman (1992, p.37) points out, this does 
not happen in real-time:
“The map that unfolds through time in any musical piece cannot be very 
accurate, since the tempo of change in states expressed in music is much 
faster than real life transformations in emotional states.”
However, I think this unfolding of an emotional state in time is a large part 
of how we value expression as an aesthetic quality of music. The expressive 
qualities of the music are praised by us when we are able to hear a particular 
kind of emotion in the music and when our imagination can follow the 
development of that emotion. The same principles apply to our experience 
of expression in music as to the value of the experience of music as form, 
which I investigated in part two. How we perceive the expressive content as 
developing will hold our interest to a greater or lesser degree depending on 
the decisions made by the composer and our ability to understand and 
consequently perceive and anticipate those decisions. In addition to there 
being a sufficient interest generated by the way the emotion evolves, there 
must be sense of coherence in the expressive content of the music. By 
coherence, I mean that the emotional expressiveness of the piece of music is 
consistent, or if the emotional tone changes, it appears to do so in a 
comprehensible fashion. If the music impedes our imaginative faculty from 
forming a clear impression of the emotion, either by introducing elements 
that are incongruent with the experience of any recognisable emotion, or by 
unintelligibly changing the nature of the dominant expressed emotion, the
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criterion of coherence will not be satisfied. It is this notion of coherence (as 
I have defined it) that allows us to see how much music that has little purely 
formal interest for us, can be of significant aesthetic value. This is because 
the emotions are expressed in the music are done so in a subtle, incisive and 
comprehensible way. Emotional expressiveness in any area of art is a 
particular sensitive property. There is a fine line between emotional content 
that seems contrived and superficial and that which appears sincere and 
appropriate. To create a piece of music that expresses feelings of love, for 
example, is notoriously difficult to do without it becoming sentimental or 
insipid. However, when it is achieved, there is a sense in the listener that the 
composer has achieved something special; they have created something that 
exhibits a certain emotional beauty. The emotion is expressed in such a way 
that our imagination can conceive of it clearly. As soon as the expression is 
compromised due to an incomprehensible development or an incongruous 
change of tone, the imaginative spell is broken.
Something that one might be tempted to forget when one considers the 
concepts of musical form and expression separately, is that form is a means 
of expression and conversely expression is a goal of form. This fact is 
sometimes obscured by the realisation that we can appreciate the formal 
qualities of a piece of music without paying any heed to expressive content. 
However, it is also the case that to truly appreciate certain aspects of form 
one must have some inclination as to the expressive aims of the passages of 
music in which those forms occur. Melodic patterns and harmonic shifts in 
music can be incomprehensible until one has come to understand the 
expressive goals of those changes. Once the broad emotional tone of the 
music has been understood, then the formal events within that piece can be 
better understood within that context. The result is that the aesthetic value 
we ascribe to the formal aspects of the music can be revised in light of a
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greater understanding of the expressive content. Each aspect of the music 
can inform and ameliorate our experience of the other.
That the expressive nature of a piece of music can be informative when it 
comes to making judgments concerning the value of its form, should alert us 
to the thought that to isolate our experience of the music from its broader 
context is detrimental to our appreciation of it. In a similar vein, Budd 
thinks that the value of music as an artform is far less mysterious if we 
refrain from regarding it as purely disconnected from the rest of our lives. It 
is only when it is taken in complete isolation that it is mysterious as to what 
we find so attractive about it. Budd (1995, p. 159) writes:
“I believe that the appearance of an insuperable or deep mystery arises only 
if music as an abstract art is regarded in a false way that isolates it from 
everything else: only by forgetting how much is involved in the experience 
of music and music’s manifold connections with extra-musical properties 
and values will music’s value as an art seem to pose a theoretical problem of 
unusual difficulty. What is needed to render intelligible, unmysterious, the 
fact that we value so highly music as an abstract art is, therefore, not only an 
account of what constitutes its artistic values but a vivid realisation of the 
manifold connections between these values and our extra-musical lives.”
Conclusion
In sum, I have argued that there is no one account that captures all possible 
experiences of music as expressive. However, as described, we can at least 
make sense of the idea that there are expressive musical properties. 
Furthermore, I have argued that we can conceive of expressive properties as 
aesthetically valuable in terms of their coherence for example, as well as the 
imaginative endeavour involved in the experience of these properties.
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Finally, I contended that expressive properties are also aesthetically 
valuable in terms of their mutually supportive relationship with music’s 
formal properties.
4. Musical Understanding
In the preceding part, I hope to have shown how expressiveness can be 
experienced as a property of the music. In this respect, part of Hanslick’s 
challenge has been met. There are ways of coherently explaining what we 
do seem to experience, namely how we might apply emotive terms to music 
in a way that goes beyond the figurative use that Hanslick endorsed. 
Nonetheless, one might still object to the inclusion of expressiveness as 
relevant to music’s aesthetic value, even if it does occupy a seemingly 
appropriate place in our experience. The complaint may be that the 
experience of expression in music, unlike that of form, is entirely dependent 
on the experiencing subject. While we are all capable of experiencing the 
same formal qualities, the expressive nature of a piece of music seems 
determined by the condition of the listener and thus can only really be 
experienced by them alone. The formalist would contend that to admit 
aesthetic judgments based on one’s experience of expression would seem to 
be to doom the notion of aesthetic value to either a strange duality (where 
music might be held to have subjective and objective values), or a hopeless 
relativity. However, if it can be shown that the whole experience of music, 
even in its most basic features, is dependent on the imaginative contribution 
of the listener, then the gap between formal and expressive properties can be 
bridged. It would no longer be possible to hold that the formal properties 
were objective properties of music while expressive properties were not. In 
what follows, I will argue that rather than believe that our experience of 
formal properties is simply a direct representation in our minds of our 
sensory intake of sound, we should conceive of music itself as an
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imaginative construction and that what we hear when we hear sound as 
music is a function of our musical understanding.
This part will be divided into two sections. In the first, I will describe how 
we might begin to understand such a view. In the second, I will consider the 
impact of our musical understanding on our aesthetic evaluation of both 
formal and expressive qualities of music.
4.1. Music as a Product of Understanding
The experience of music can be reshaped and altered by augmenting, 
refining or even reducing the tools of our musical understanding. One 
preliminary way of making sense of the notion of understanding in music is 
to claim, as Kivy does, that music is understood under a description. For 
example, when one has a greater understanding of the theory behind the 
music, one is able to hear the music as falling under different descriptions 
that would not be available to the untrained listener. The kinds of 
descriptions a listener is able to construe the music as falling under, are (at 
least partly) constitutive of their “understanding” of music. While the 
untrained listener may not be able to provide the analysis of music in formal 
terms that a learned expert could, they nonetheless do hear the music under 
their own description. Kivy (1990 p. 100) holds that these can be the more 
familiar layman’s descriptions, typically in emotive terms such as:
“...doubt, anxiety, groping, ambiguity, and eventually the resolution (in the 
ordinary sense of the word) of those psychological states”.
Kivy (1990 p. 100) also adds that:
“ .. .both will be describing the same sonic event.”
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Kivy seems to be suggesting that when the less musically trained listener 
uses emotive terms to describe music, they describe the same aspects of the 
music that the trained listener does, just with a more limited terminology. 
This might often be the truth of the matter. For instance, if we lack a 
sophisticated musical vocabulary and we want to describe the audible 
behaviour of a particular passage of music, we are forced to use whatever 
terms we can, from whatever perceptual schemes, that may be roughly 
analogous to the properties of the music we are trying to describe. So we 
might describe the music as bright, boisterous or cheerful but, in doing so, 
we are simply trying to communicate some of the audible character of the 
music.
However, what this description of musical understanding seems to obscure 
is the potential difference in experience of the music between the trained 
and untrained listeners. We might be tempted to think that there is no 
phenomenological difference in the experiences of someone who perfectly 
understands, say, a style or passage of music and that of someone who has 
no understanding. If we take the notion of musical understanding as simply 
the ability to describe music in more or less complicated and subtle terms, 
then the temptation is quite natural. However, musical understanding is not 
just the ability to describe a particular style or passage of music, but the 
ability to hear certain sounds as music forming a particular passage or style. 
This distinction can be brought out if we consider the most basic type of 
musical understanding. To begin with, there must be some kind of prior 
understanding that one is listening to music as opposed to just miscellaneous 
audible sounds. Ridley describes this kind of understanding as a kind of 
meta-condition. He writes:
“One can say straight away that in order to hear music with understanding it 
is essential to understand that what one is hearing is music; to hear what one
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hears, in other words, as music, and not merely as an auditory stimulus of 
some unspecified kind, or as noise. For the experience of hearing music is 
not the same as the experience of hearing sounds. A melody is not merely a 
series of pitched sounds, nor is a rhythm a mere succession of louder and 
quieter sounds. Rather, in each case, those who understand what they are 
hearing hear the sounds as a melody, or as a rhythm, so that their 
understanding is a way of hearing certain successions and clusters of pitched 
and unpitched sounds as tones, rhythms, melodies, harmonies, and so forth.” 
(Ridley, 1993, p.589)
Ridley (1993, p.590) characterises the difference between the musical and 
the non-musical experience as between the former involving only “sensory” 
properties while the latter, “perceptual” properties. This terminology might 
seem a little confusing, as surely we “perceive” sensory properties, whether 
musical or not? However, the distinction is intended to capture the sense 
that the perception of musical forms and musical expressive qualities, what I 
shall commonly refer to as “musical qualities”, is essentially imbued with a 
level of interpretation that the experience of mere sound is not. For example, 
as Nicolas Cook (1992, p.22) explains:
“Even in the simplest possible contexts, musical perception is not so literal 
as to be in one-to-one correspondence to the input signal.”
Thus sounds are not merely perceived, but are perceived or heard as 
rhythms or melodies. To hear a sequence of sounds as music is to have an 
experience involving certain perceptual qualities such as rhythm and 
melody. So the minimal sense of understanding music is that one should be 
able to have such experiences when listening to the sounds. Accordingly, 
Ridley describes the perceptual properties as sensory properties that are 
interpreted under a description. But, “under a description” here does not
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refer to what we are able to articulate in the form of a verbal description. I 
think the best way to understand this claim is that when we hear sounds as 
music and thus experience the perceptual properties of rhythm, for example, 
we are interpreting the raw sounds we hear as being grouped in a certain 
way, or to put it slightly differently, we establish a mental specification as to 
how those sounds are related to one another. However, the way in which we 
do create these groupings is influenced by our condition as listening subject. 
For instance, to be able to understand most music requires that we perceive 
the music as in some way rhythmical. But, how we interpret that rhythm is 
at least partially a matter of how we interpret and specify the relations 
between the notes. The important point is that our ability to discern rhythms 
in sequences of sounds is not solely dependent on our ability to detect 
sounds. To hear the same sequence of sounds as on one occasion rhythmic, 
and on another not, are two fundamentally different experiences. But 
equally, one is able, depending on one’s abilities, to hear the same sequence 
of notes as different rhythms. Ridley points out this aspect of our listening 
experience in the following passage. He writes:
“ ... the perceptual properties which the experience of a musical work may 
have will be shaped and constrained, not only by the nature of the object of 
experience (e.g., which sounds it contains), but also but the condition of the 
listener whose experience it is. Thus two listeners who hear a piece of music 
as music -  and whose experiences therefore share a certain minimum set of 
perceptual properties - may nevertheless differ in what further perceptual 
properties their experiences have, according to their differing capacities and 
dispositions, and to the varying degrees in which their previous experiences 
are related to the object of their current experience. A tired or inattentive 
listener, or a listener whose rhythmic sense is relatively poor, may hear two 
passages as having the same rhythm where a more alert or gifted listener 
hears a rhythmic difference. So one kind of perceptual property (e.g.
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rhythm) may be possessed by an experience to varying degrees. But in 
addition, it may be that one listener’s experience altogether lacks a 
perceptual property which is possessed by a second listener’s. ” (Ridley, 
1993, p.590)
Ridley does not think that we can give a necessary condition for the minimal 
musical experience. For instance, we might be tempted to say that all music 
is essentially rhythmical and that the perceptual property (in Ridley’s sense) 
of rhythm is a necessary condition for a basic musical understanding. 
However, drone music, examples of which might include some avant-garde 
electronic music as well as some bagpipe music, is not rhythmical in any 
recognisable sense. It is very hard, if not impossible, to hear such music as 
rhythmical. In any case, even if it were possible, having the perceptual 
property of rhythm may simply be inappropriate. For example, Ridley 
(1993, p.591) suggests that to hear a drum solo as rhythmic is to have an 
appropriate musical experience in that the content of the experience includes 
a rhythmic perceptual property. However, were we to perceive the drum 
solo as melodic, this would be in most cases to include an inappropriate 
perceptual property. Which properties we take to be appropriate to the 
experience of a piece of music is also a function of our musical 
understanding; it is on the basis of what we have learnt about the music, 
either through prior information or trial and error that we are able to 
determine which properties we should perceive in order to have an 
appropriate (or perhaps just a rewarding) experience of the music. As Ridley 
(1993, p.591) describes:
“If the sounds comprise an unpitched series, then we will be interested in 
rhythm; if pitches sounded together, then in harmony; and so forth.”
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If these are the kinds of conditions for something to be music as opposed to 
noise, then what are the other features that must be present in order for us to 
be able to distinguish between and understand different pieces of music, for 
example? Ridley says that just the simple inclusion of perceptual properties 
cannot be all that there is to understanding a particular piece of music. He 
says:
“I suggest, therefore, that (truly) understanding listeners are listeners with 
the capacity and disposition to adjust the way they hear to what they hear, 
where such adjustment is not, or is not simply, a matter of accumulation 
and/or intensification of perceptual properties (in simple music after all such 
an accumulation may lead to an understanding which is pretentious). The 
perceptual properties need to be the right properties, and their intensities 
must be apt.” (Ridley, 1993, p.591)
What this highlights is that the listener can take an active part in the shaping 
of their experience of the music. In order to hear the music in the 
appropriate way, the listener can regulate which properties and to what 
degree they should figure in their experience. It may be that although this 
process is most often unconsciously performed in that we generally hear 
music in the ways in which we are accustomed, it is possible to a certain 
extent to consciously focus one’s attention in different ways, thus resulting 
in different properties becoming the content of one’s experience. In a way 
analogous to how we open or close our eyes to let more or less light in, we 
can try to consciously adjust our experience so that certain aspects of the 
music receive the right amount of attention (in some unusual cases perhaps 
none at all). The point is that we adjust the selection and intensity of the 
perceptual properties according to our preference for how we think the 
music should be heard.
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At this point, it might be objected that all this may be true, we may be able 
to alter the nature of our experience through shifting our focus from rhythm 
to melody for example, nonetheless what we are focusing on; the music, is 
unchanged. All we are doing is turning a blind eye to some parts of it. The 
view that when we are hearing sound as music, we are “imaginatively 
perceiving”, counts against this contention. Roger Scruton (1998, ch.8) 
argues that music is an “intentional object” and that the descriptions we 
apply to music, be they of its formal or expressive qualities, are true of no 
material fact. For example, to hear a sequence of tones as a scale is to hear 
them not as a series of individuals, but as a single moving line. However, 
this cannot be literally true of anything outside of our own experience. As 
Scruton (1979, p.81) says:
“We may find ourselves at a loss for an answer to that question: for, literally 
speaking, nothing does move. There is one note, and then another; 
movement, however, demands one thing, which passes from place to place.”
Scruton (1998, pp. 92-97) argues at length that the idea of auditory space 
can only be construed metaphorically. When we hear the movement of a 
musical line, we are perceiving sound imaginatively. Musical lines have no 
material existence; they only exist in terms of the metaphor of space.
Scruton considers the metaphor of space to be the most deeply entrenched in 
our experience of music. He thinks there is no way that we can make sense 
of the idea as occurring in the world independently of our experience. He 
maintains that:
“It seems that in our most basic apprehension of music there lies a complex 
system of metaphor, which is the true description of no material fact. And 
the metaphor cannot be eliminated from the description of music, because it 
is integral to the intentional object of musical experience. Take this
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metaphor away and you take away the experience of m u s i c . ’’( S c r u t o n ,  1983,
p. 106)
Scruton considers the objection that all his argument shows is that musical 
properties are simply secondary properties of the objects, rather than 
primary properties of the sounds that possess them. He says:
“To think that they are therefore not part of the material world in some 
significant sense (some sense that does not merely reiterate the scientific 
realist’s commitment to the explanatory priority of primary qualities) is to 
repeat a mistake at least as old as Berkeley. It is to think that because the 
sense of a term (e.g. ‘red’) is to be specified in terms of certain experiences 
involved in its application, its reference must therefore be intentional rather 
than material.” (Scruton, 1998, p.99)
Scruton responds by saying that in a sense the objection stands up. The 
terms we use to describe music do refer to material sounds. However, they 
refer to them in a way that cannot be captured by a scientific description of 
the material sound itself. That is to say that the description under which our 
musical terms are understood, is only applicable within a metaphorical 
scheme. As Scruton (1998, p.99) says:
“Sounds do not move as music moves ... Nor are they organised in a spatial 
way ..., nor do they rise and fall. These are all metaphors, and one thing that 
distinguishes metaphors from scientific descriptions is that they are, when 
successful, false.”
The distinction between secondary qualities and even the basic musical 
qualities such as the experience of form can be made clearer. Scruton (1998, 
p. 100) points out that
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. .to perceive a secondary quality is a sensory capacity, and depends only 
upon the power of sensory discrimination”.
The ability to discriminate between such sensory qualities is possessed by 
other animals and does not depend on any kind of cognitive ability. 
Furthermore, the ability cannot be improved by any kind of intellectual 
training or education. It is this fact that Scruton says leads us to think that 
sensory qualities such as colour (what we would call secondary qualities) 
really do in fact inhere in the objects that display them. We cannot be 
educated into perceiving those that we are initially unable to, and vice versa 
into dispensing of those that we can. However, this doesn’t seem to be the 
case with our experience of musical properties such as form and expression. 
In the case of form and expression, changes in one’s intellectual capacities 
and general psychological disposition can influence changes in the nature of 
the musical properties that one experiences. As Scruton (1998, p. 100) says:
“[Musical qualities] are more closely analogous to aspects -  the man in the 
moon, the face in the cloud, the child in the picture -  which are sometimes 
called ‘tertiary’ qualities, in order to emphasise the peculiar nature of their 
dependence upon our capacities to observe them. ‘Tertiary’ qualities are 
often thought not to be genuine qualities of the things which possess them: 
first, because of their ‘supervenience’, secondly, because they are neither 
deductions from experience nor used in the explanation of experience; 
thirdly, because their perception requires peculiar capacities (such as 
imagination) which cannot be tied down to any ‘sense’, and which perhaps 
do not belong to speechless beings. It does not matter much for present 
purposes whether we take a ‘realist’ view of these qualities. What does 
matter is that we should recognise the peculiar dependence of our power to 
observe them upon our power of thought.”
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However, one might want to question the degree to which the experience of 
music is created by the active imaginings of the listener. For example, it 
seems that there are times when we hear music in the background and we 
are making no conscious effort to interpret what we hear. Nonetheless, what 
we hear is music and we are aware of it as such, even if we are not really 
listening to it. An example of this might be something like lift music or the 
“jingles” we hear emanating from our televisions. If the experience of music 
is something that is the result of our imaginative perception, then a 
significant contribution is made by our sub-consciously hearing the music as 
having certain qualities. It seems as though the kind of minimal musical 
understanding that Ridley suggests distinguishes our experience of sound 
from that of music is beyond our active control. It is only the further 
refinement of the perceptual properties that we can have any influence over. 
But, for Scruton, the active participation of the subject in the imaginative 
realisation of music in their experience is central to making sense of the way 
we make evaluative judgments about the music. As he explains:
“The voluntary character of this perception provides one of the foundations 
for the structural criticism of music. It is because I can ask someone to hear 
a movement as beginning in a certain place, as phrased in a certain way, and 
so on, that the activity of giving reasons in support of such analysis makes 
sense. Much of music criticism consists of the deliberate construction of an 
intentional object from the infinitely ambiguous instructions implicit in a 
sequence of sounds.” (Scruton, 1998, p. 101)
Scruton thinks that we can persuade ourselves into hearing sounds as being 
related to each other in different ways, so long as we can make a coherent 
case for the specification of those relations. While this can certainly account 
for, say the role of the music critic whose task is to direct our attention 
towards different aspects of the music, it nevertheless seems as though
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much in our experience of the form of music is already predetermined and 
immovable before our consciousness has an opportunity to alter it. Cook 
(1992, p.25) reminds us that psychologists employ the notion of “perceptual 
construction” to account for the fact that perception in general is not a literal 
response to the sensory attributes of stimuli. The concept of perceptual 
construction does to some extent undermine Scruton’s notion of imaginative 
listening as it emphasises the pre-conscious and involuntary aspect of the 
process. A standard example of involuntary perceptual construction is the 
“Phi” phenomenon. This refers to the experiment where two lights are 
alternately turned on and off in a dark room and the resultant impression is 
one of a single light that swings back and forth. Perceptual construction is 
not amenable to rational argument as Scruton wants imaginative perception 
to be. In addition, there seem to be certain limits as to what a person can 
choose to imagine when they hear certain sounds. Cook (1992, p.25) gives 
the example of our not choosing to hear a violin being played backwards as 
“a series of smears, grunts, and squeaks”. We can do little to avoid this 
outcome.
Perhaps musical understanding in fact plays a much lesser role in 
determining what we hear than Scruton thinks and if this were the case, then 
it would seem more natural to say that our experience of music’s formal 
qualities, such as rhythmic patterns and melodic lines, is in fact more akin to 
our experience of secondary qualities. They are listener dependent only in 
the sense that a normally functioning listener must experience the sounds in 
order to have the experiences. On the other hand, the music’s expressive 
qualities seem to be unquestionably in the realm of tertiary qualities. Even if 
we were to accept that the experience of music’s form (which is essential if 
we are to have an experience of music at all) is on the level of an intentional 
object, when we fulfil the criterion of a normal perceiver in normal 
conditions, we will perceive only one set of formal qualities, irrespective of
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our level of musical understanding. This is, after all, what seems to be the 
nature of the majority of our musical experiences. We do not in general 
experience the kind of formal re-orientation that Scruton describes and this 
might lead us to think that our musical understanding plays as much of a 
role in our experience as Scruton wants to claim it does.
In reply to this, it does not seem implausible to me that we should accept 
that much of our musical understanding is manifested un-consciously. By 
the time most people are old enough to speak, they have typically been 
exposed to countless examples of music in the tradition in which they have 
been raised. A slow process of learning and acculturation cements 
interpretive techniques into the person’s psychological background and 
forms the basic tools for their minimal musical understanding. The 
unconscious action of one’s musical understanding in the shaping of one 
experience of music, explains why when one hears a piece of music as 
having a certain rhythmic pattern, it is very hard to imagine how it could be 
experienced differently. It is at this point that the active part of our 
imaginative perception beings to take effect and we are able to in a sense 
“override” the initial impression delivered through our unconscious 
understanding, with an alternative conscious interpretation. Scruton (1998, 
p. 102) provides an example from the opening of Parsifal, where the same 
temporal order of notes can be heard as having a different rhythm. The 
listener can direct his attention in different ways in order to arrive at a 
different rhythmic interpretation of the same sequence of notes.
4.2. Understanding and the Aesthetic Value of Music
We have been considering the view that our experience of musical 
properties depends on our musical understanding. What bearing does this 
have on the aesthetic value of formal and expressive properties of music?
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Firstly, what we experience as the music’s form, such as its particular 
rhythmic patterns or melodic lines, are properties that do not belong to an 
independently existing material thing. As expressive properties are 
dependent for their existence on formal properties, we can duly surmise that 
expressive properties are also properties of no material thing. In this sense at 
least, they are on a par.
Conclusion
For Hanslick, our experience of music’s formal qualities is experience of 
properties that derive their existence from something, the music (whether 
construed as performance or notation), that had an existence outside of our 
own experience of it. Thus Hanslick was seduced into thinking that if one 
abstracted from all of one’s interpretive tendencies when listening to music, 
one would be approximating a kind of “pure” aesthetic experience. The 
properties that manifest themselves to someone having this kind of pure 
experience would be what Hanslick takes to be the truly aesthetic properties 
of the music; the formal properties. The notion of a pure aesthetic 
experience remains a tempting one. If we aim to provide any kind of firm 
ground for our aesthetic judgments then surely, this is the kind of experience 
we should be aiming to capture? However, Hanslick did not discuss, or at 
least underestimated the possibility that for the sounds to be heard as music, 
there must be a framework of understanding utilised by the listener. Those 
sounds must be understood in a particular way, and the sequences of notes 
are ambivalent, at least to a certain degree, as to which interpretations can 
be made of them. This framework is a pre-requisite for grasping musical 
form and therefore aesthetically evaluating the music. It is this 
understanding that shapes the experience of the music and thus its aesthetic 
character. If the music is not understood, then there can be no scope for 
judgment concerning its aesthetic value.
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If the experience of form is an interpretive result of our musical 
understanding, then what should we make of the experience of expression? 
We know the experience of expression is parasitic on an initial experience 
of the music formal qualities. I maintain that the music’s expressive 
qualities are best understood as a “higher order” perceptual property of the 
music. By this I mean that they are also an interpretive product of our 
musical understanding. The difference is that expressive properties are 
interpretations of music’s form, while form is an interpretation of the 
sensory qualities of sound. Just as the terms used to describe form, do not 
have a literal application to the material world of sounds, our 
characterisations of music in emotional terms do not have a literal 
application (in the sense that the music is something that exhibits emotional 
qualities outside of our imaginative experience). Much of the time we 
experience expressive qualities of music just as immediately and with as 
little conscious participation as our experiences of formal qualities. As both 
are a function of a developed musical understanding, it is understandable 
how both kinds of properties can seem so immediate in our experience of 
music. Thus on the view that I am advocating, one cannot discount our 
experience of expressive properties as somehow inferior to our experience 
of formal properties on the grounds that they are interpretive or subjective, 
as both form and expression are subjectively interpreted properties of our 
experience.
Overall Conclusion
I have argued in support of the claim that both formal and expressive 
qualities are equally relevant to our judgements concerning the aesthetic 
value of music. I chose to narrow the focus of my enquiry to instrumental 
music, taking it to be the “hard case” in this context.
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I began my investigation in part one by considering the nature of aesthetic 
experience, taking it that aesthetic value is grounded in such experience. I 
argued that the content-orientated approach to characterising aesthetic 
experience is the only viable option. I then explained that form and 
expression are typically considered paradigmatic musical properties and I 
resolved to establish whether they could justifiably be considered to be so.
Part two was devoted to a discussion of musical form. I began by describing 
what I understood form to consist in. I took it to include both Green’s 
notions of musical shape and form. I then examined how we could value the 
experience of music for its formal qualities. I explored Kivy’s idea that we 
play “games” with the form of the music in our experience of it; namely, 
what he called the hypothesis and hide-and-seek games. I concluded part 
two by considering Hanslick’s formalist position that the formal qualities of 
music alone are relevant to its aesthetic value. I maintained that Hanslick’s 
argument does not establish this conclusion.
Part three was an exploration of expression in music. I examined various 
theories of expression and established that no one account captures all the 
possible ways one might experience music as expressive. I maintained 
nonetheless that we can make sense of the idea of expression experienced as 
a musical quality. I then argued that expression can be considered an 
aesthetically valuable quality of music in virtue of its coherence and the 
imaginative stimulation it provokes. I also claimed that expression is 
valuable in terms of its mutually supportive relationship with form.
Finally, in part four, I addressed the claim that expression is inferior to form 
in terms of its relevance to the aesthetic value of music as expression alone 
is subjective. I developed an account of musical understanding, which 
claims that both our experience of expressive and formal qualities of music
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are products of our understanding and therefore have a subjective existence. 
Form and expression are therefore equal in this sense and thus have equal 
claim to aesthetic value.
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